That's a very astute explanation, because I wanted to ask you about Syria, but you already went into it. Is it maybe so that Russia or Russian leadership started to believe in their own mystique that they created around their special operations, the robotic space, and those types of areas? Well,

it's not just its not just its belief. I think what what happened was a lot of the information, which, again, we have to obviously assume that the Russian military intel was conducting adequate enough operations to collect enough information about the state and the status of Ukrainian military to possibly sound concern or alarm over the fact that this wasn't going to be the military that is just going to roll over. This isn't going to be the same campaign as in Syria. Ukrainians have been preparing for this for years. They've been training. They were getting Western assistance, American assistance, European assistance. This isn't going to be the military that is basically like the empty Assad militias fighting in Syria. And a lot of that intel analysis probably was correct and on point, but it never made it up to the higher echelons, or perhaps it did. But a lot of the Russian decisions about this war were made for political reasons, not necessarily for military reasons. So I think we'll be analyzing the space for years to come. It's very difficult right now to make any definitive conclusions. But it looks like even if FOD had actionable, correct intelligence, he was probably sidelined and savor of reports that portrayed Ukrainian situation the way Kremlin wanted to see it, not the way it actually was. And so this resulted in the decisions made at the initial days of the war, where the Russian military thought it's invasion of Ukraine is going to be just a walk

in the park.