The Limitivism of Consciousness

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"It's easy to think that consciousness ought to be like how atoms cause cars, right? Because everything else in the world is," he says. "But you would be a fool to deny that cars can't be explained by our understanding of atoms." The non-material character of consciousness is the illusion, but the consciousness itself isn't, Nagle adds.

We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?

Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.

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