But now you

will frame who is virtuous, you know, people in the world who are virtuous with people who are trying to understand justice. That's the new distinction. Like before it was people who knew justice who didn't that was good versus bad, but now it's people who are trying versus people aren't even trying. That's the new distinction. And you can embrace that.

Right. I mean, I guess that's exactly what happens at the end of the Alcibiades. You know, Alcibiades is basically like Socrates. I'm in a D like your groupie from now on. And Socrates doesn't, I mean, that's a quite workout between Socrates and Alcibiades, but he does end up with a lot of groupies. And maybe that's the that's the self conception that he offers people is that we are the people who are we can we can retreat to the position of being the people who could figure

it out. Now, in some sense, this is the prototypical rationalist move. Right. So the simple minded concept of intellectuals is some of some of them know more than others. Right. I learn relativity and now I can look down on people who don't know relativity, right? That's like, I've read the encyclopedia section B. So I know bees and battleships and I'm better than you because I know about bees and battleships. And then at some point, people realize how little they know how many things other people know. And now counting up who knows more is a little problematic. And people switch their identity to, okay, I am an enquirer of a certain sort. And I follow certain rules and I admit when I'm wrong. And that's my new identity. And that's in some sense that the rationalists switch or even the even the philosopher switch, right? The philosopher isn't the person who knows a lot of philosophy that philosophers a person who knows how to inquire into philosophy.

So I guess I think like, um, um, sometimes it seems to me that the rationalist move is just locating a different place to be arrogant. Well, of course, yeah. Um, yes, but it's a more defensible place. It's

the point. And, um, but I

think that, I mean, the position that Alcibiades is in is he's thinking to himself, I have to know P, but I don't know P, right? Those are like the, um, the things that he's trying to combine. And I guess I feel like, um, I often feel that the rationalists just give up on me, I have to know, like that they're happy with themselves if they have like some kind of good estimate of how wrong they might be or something. And that that's like, that's all a person could ever really want. Um, and what like, you know, even if we do say that Socrates is offering people the opportunity for a certain kind of virtue, the thought is like, yeah, but it's supposed to not be enough. Like it's supposed to be a form of virtue where you're always aware that you don't have this other thing. Um,

right. Uh, it's sort

of like the very title of less wrong. It's almost like we're trying to be less strong, but also we're like less wrong than the rest of you. So actually we're just like better than everybody else. Um, um, as opposed to like, no, we want to be right. Like that is that's the goal. Um, and, um, and so we're, we're defective in virtue of not being right. And it's not, it's unacceptable that we don't know what virtue is or justices. Um, and so that that's a different, um, that there's a certain characteristic misunderstanding of Socrates where what he's doing is retreating to one piece of meta knowledge, namely that he knows that he doesn't know anything except this one piece of knowledge, right? Yeah. And I think that that's a lot like what rationalists are like, but it's not what Socrates is like. He doesn't retreat to that piece of meta knowledge. He's always like, um, um, um, um, on the battleground, like trying to figure out what justice is and being like, okay, maybe this guy knows. Um, and that, that does seem like a different way of combining. I must know P and I don't know P that the, the, the inquisitive way.