The Subjective Character of Consciousness

3min Snip

00:00

Play full episode

Summary

Transcript

Episode notes

The most important characteristic feature of conscious mental phenomenon is very poorly understood. Most reductionist theories do not even try to explain it. It's useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character, he says. "There is no reason to suppose that a reduction which seems plausible ... can be extended to include consciousness"

We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?

Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.

Support Very Bad Wizards

Links: