I want to disagree alla bit with the um in the game for politicians. It seems to me there's a big difference between a president's skin in the game and a, say, a senator voting for some resolution related to that war. The optimal structure is when a person is penalized a long term from inaction. And that only happens if in a disent, decentralized system. See, for example, the mayor of a smallryonow village in switzerland,. If he fails, his reputation as somhe has more skill in game than the bureaucrats in washington whose actiom cannot beden and and asol.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the manuscript version of his forthcoming book, Skin in the Game. Topics discussed include the role of skin in the game in labor markets, the power of minorities, the Lindy effect, Taleb's blind spots and regrets, and the politics of globalization.