Shifting Dynamics in the Syrian Civil War

This week we talk about coups, the Arab Spring, and Bashar al-Assad.

We also discuss militias, Al Qaeda, and Iran.

Recommended Book: The Algebraist by Iain M. Banks

Transcript

In the early 2010s, a series of uprisings against unpopular, authoritarian governments spread across the Middle East—a wave of action that became known as the Arab Spring.

Tunisia was where it started, a man setting himself on fire in protest against the nation’s brazenly corrupt government and all that he’d suffered under that government, and the spreading of this final gesture on social media, which was burgeoning at the time, amplified by the still relatively newfound availability and popularity of smartphones, the mobile internet, and the common capacity to share images and videos of things as they happen to folks around the world via social media, led to a bunch of protests and riots and uprisings in Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, and Algeria, initially, before then spreading to other, mostly Arab majority, mostly authoritarian-led nations.

The impact of this cascade of unrest in this region was immediately felt; within just two years, by early 2012, those ruling Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen had been toppled, there were attempts to topple the Bahraini and Syrian governments, there were massive protests in Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Algeria, and Sudan, and relatively minor protests, which were still meaningful because of the potential punishments for folks who rocked the boat in these countries, smaller protests erupted in Djibouti, Western Sahara, Saudi Arabia, Palestine, and Mauritania.

Several rulers and their ruling parties committed to stepping down soon, or to not run for reelection—some of them actually stuck with that commitment, though others rode out this period of tumult and then quietly backtracked.

Some nations saw long-lasting periods of unrest following this eruption; Jordan had trouble keeping a government in office for years, for instance, while Yemen overthrew its government in 2012 and 2015, and that spun-out into a civil war between the official government and the Iran-backed Houthis, which continues today, gumming up the Red Sea and significantly disrupting global shipping as a consequence.

What I’d like to talk about today, though, is another seriously disruptive sequence of events that have shaped the region, and a lot of things globally, as well, since the first sparks of what became the Arab Spring—namely, the Syrian Civil war—and some movement we’ve seen in this conflict over the past week that could result in a dramatically new state of affairs across the region.

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In 1963, inspired by their brethren’s successful coup in nearby Iraq, the military wing of the Arab nationalist Ba’ath party of Syria launched a coup against the country’s post-colonial democratic government, installing in its stead a totalitarian party-run government.

One of the leaders of this coup, Hafez al-Assad, became the country’s president in 1971, which basically meant he was the all-powerful leader of a military dictatorship, and he used those powers to even further consolidate his influence over the mechanisms of state, which meant he also had the ability to name his own successor.

He initially planned to install his brother as leader when he stepped down or died, but that brother attempted to overthrow him when he was ill in 1983 and 1984, so when he got better, he exiled said brother and chose his eldest son, Bassel al-Assad, instead.

Bassel died in a car accident in 1994, though, so Hafez was left with his third choice, Bashar al-Assad, which wasn’t a popular choice, in part because it was considered not ideal for him to choose a family member, rather than someone else from the leading party, but also because Bashar had no political experience at the time, so this was straight-up nepotism: the only reason he was selected was that he was family.

In mid-2000, Hafez died, and Bashar stepped into the role of president. The next few years were tumultuous for the new leader, who faced heightened calls for more transparency in the government, and a return to democracy, or some form of it at least, in Syria.

This, added to Bashar’s lack of influence with his fellow party members, led to a wave of retirements and purgings amongst the government and military higher-ups—those veteran politicians and generals replaced by loyalists with less experience and credibility.

He then made a series of economic decisions that were really good for the Assad family and their allies, but really bad for pretty much everyone else in the country, which made him and his government even less popular with much of the Syrian population, even amongst those who formerly supported his ascension and ambitions.

All of this pushback from the people nudged Bashar al-Assad into implementing an increasingly stern police state, which pitted various ethnic and religious groups against each other in order to keep them from unifying against the government, and which used terror and repression to slap down or kill anyone who stood up to the abuse.

When the Arab Spring, which I mentioned in the intro, rippled across the Arab world beginning in 2011, protestors in Syria were treated horribly by the Assad government—the crackdown incredibly violent and punitive, even compared to that of other repressive, totalitarian governments in the region.

This led to more pushback from Syrian citizens, who began to demand, with increasing intensity, that the Assad-run government step down, and that the Ba’athists running the dictatorship be replaced by democratically elected officials.

This didn’t go over well with Assad, who launched a campaign of even more brutal, violent crackdowns, mass arrests, and the torture and execution of people who spoke out on this subject—leading to thousands of confirmed deaths, and tens of thousands of people wounded by government forces.

This response didn’t go over super well with the people, and these protests and the pushback against them spiraled into a full-on civil uprising later in 2011, a bunch of people leaving the Syrian military to join the rebels, and the country breaking up into pieces, each chunk of land controlled by a different militia, some of these militias working well together, unifying against the government, while others also fought other militias—a remnant of the military government’s efforts to keep their potential opposition fighting each other, rather than them.

This conflict was officially declared a civil war by the UN in mid-2012, and the UN and other such organizations have been fretting and speaking out about the human rights violations and other atrocities committed during this conflict ever since, though little has been done by external forces, practically, to end it—instead it’s become one of many proxy conflicts, various sides supported, mostly with weapons and other resources, though sometimes with training, and in rare instances with actual soldiers on the ground, by the US, Turkey, Russia, Iran, the Iran-backed group Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Britain, France, Israel, and the Netherlands.

This conflict has demanded the country’s full attention for more than a decade, then, and it’s had influence even beyond Syria’s borders, as groups like the Islamic State, or ISIS has been able to grow and flourish within Syria, due to all the chaos and lack of stability, refugees from Syria have flooded across borders, fleeing the violence and causing all sorts of unintended disruptions in neighboring and even some further-afield countries where, in some cases, millions of these refugees have had to be taken care of, which in turn has influenced immigration-related politics even as far away as the European Union. Also due to that lack of internal control, crime has flourished in Syria, including drug-related crime. And that’s lets to a huge production and distribution network for an illegal, almost everywhere, amphetamine called Captagon, which is addictive, and the pills often contain dangerous filler chemicals that are cheaper to produce.

This has increased drug crime throughout the region, and the Syrian government derives a substantial amount of revenue from these illicit activities—it’s responsible for about 80% of global Captagon production, as of early 2024.

All of which brings us to late-2024.

By this point, Syria had been broken up into about seven or eight pieces, each controlled by some militia group or government, while other portions—which make up a substantial volume of the country’s total landmass—are considered to be up in the air, no dominant factions able to claim them.

Al-Assad’s government has received a fair bit of support, both in terms of resources, and in terms of boots on the ground, from Iran and Russia, over the years, especially in the mid-20-teens. And due in large part to that assistance, his forces were able to retake most of the opposition’s strongholds by late 2018.

There was a significant ceasefire at the tail-end of 2019, which lasted until March of 2020. This ceasefire stemmed from a successful operation launched by the Syrian government and its allies, especially Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah, against the main opposition and some of their allies—basically a group of different rebel factions that were working together against Assad, and this included groups backed by the Turkish government.

On March 5, 2020, Turkish President Erdogan and Russian President Putin, which were backing opposite sides of this portion of the Syrian civil war, agreed on a ceasefire that began the following day, which among other things included a safety corridor along a major highway, separating the groups from each other, that corridor patrolled by soldiers from Turkey and Russia.

This served to end most frontline fighting, as these groups didn’t want to start fighting these much larger, more powerful nations—Russia and Turkey—while trying to strike their enemies, though there were still smaller scuffles and attacks, when either side could hurt their opponent without being caught.

In November of 2024, though, a coalition of anti-Assad militias launched a new offensive against the Syrian government’s forces, which was ostensibly sparked by heavily shelling by those forces against civilians in rural areas outside Aleppo, the country’s second-largest city.

On the 29th of November, those forces captured most of Aleppo, and then plowed their way through previously government-held towns and cities at a fairly rapid clip, capturing another regional capitol, Hama on December 5, and securing Damascus, the capitol of the country, on December 8.

This ended the 13-year civil war that’s plagued Syria since all the way back in 2011; Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, according to Russian and Iranian officials, and he resigned before he hopped on that flight; Russian state media is saying that Assad and his family have been granted asylum by the Russian government.

This is a rapidly developing story, and we’ll know more over the next few weeks, as the dust settles, but right now it looks like the Syrian government has been toppled by rebel forces led by a man named Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, a 42-year-old child of Syrian exiles who was born in Saudi Arabia, and who spent the early 2000s fighting against US occupation forces in Iraq as part of Al Qaeda.

He apparently spent a few years in an Iraqi prison, then led an Al Qaeda affiliate group, which evolved into its own thing when he broke ties with Al Qaeda’s leadership.

This new group that he formed, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, tried to differentiate itself from groups like Al Qaeda by saying they didn’t want to play a role in the global jihad, they just wanted to reform the government in Syria. As part of that pivot, they started governing and building infrastructure across the chunk of Syria they claimed, even to the point of collecting taxes and providing civilians with identity cards; though throughout this period they were also known for ruling with an iron fist, and for being hardcore authoritarians, dedicated to implementing a hard-line version of Islamist ideological law.

In the midst of their blitz-like capture of Syria, though, representatives from this group have said they’ll implement a religiously tolerant representative government, and they won’t tell women in the country how to dress.

Following the capture of Damascus, Syria’s Prime Minister said that he would remain in the country, and that he was ready to work with whomever takes the reins as things settle down, happy to make the transition a smooth and peaceful one, essentially, whatever that might mean in practice.

The US military has taken this opportunity to strike dozens of Islamic State facilities and leaders across the country, marking one of the biggest such actions in recent months, and military leaders have said they would continue to strike terrorist groups on Syrian soil—probably as part of an effort to keep the new Syrian government, whatever its composition, from working with IS and its allies.

Russia has requested a closed-door meeting with the United Nations Security Council to discuss Syria’s collapse, and it’s been reported that they failed to come to Assad’s aid because they’re too tied up in Ukraine, and they weren’t able to move forces from North Africa rapidly enough to do much good; though there’s a chance they’ll still shift whatever chess pieces they can to the area in order to influence the composition of the new government, as it’s forming.

Iran has said they welcome whatever type of government the Syrian people decide to establish, though it’s likely they’ll try to nudge that formation in their favor, as Syria has long been an ally and client state of theirs, and they are no doubt keen to maintain that reality as much as possible, and bare-minimum to avoid the establishment of an enemy along their border.

And Israel has entered what’s supposed to be a demilitarized buffer zone in the Golan Heights because this zone is on the Syrian border; they’ve also captured a buffer zone within Syria itself. They’ve launched airstrikes on suspected chemical weapon sites in Syria, to prevent them from falling into extremist hands, they’ve said, and Israeli leaders said they want to keep any issues in their neighbor from impacting Israeli citizens. And Iraq’s government has announced that they’re doing the same along their shared border with Syria, so the whole region is bulwarking their potential weak points, just in case something goes wrong and violence spreads, rather than being tamped down by all this change.

Israel’s prime minister, and other higher ups in the government, have also claimed responsibility for Assad’s toppling, saying it was their efforts against Iran and its proxy forces, like Hezbollah, that set the stage for the rebels to do what they did—as otherwise these forces would have been too strong and too united for it to work.

Notably, the now-in-charge rebel group has been a longtime enemy of Iran and Hezbollah, so while there’s still a lot of uncertainty surrounding all of this, Israel’s government is no doubt generally happy with how things have progressed, so far, as this could mean Syria is no longer a reliable corridor for them, especially for the purposes of getting weapons to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, along Israel’s northern border.

That said, this same group isn’t exactly a fan of Israel, and is backed by Turkey, which has been highly critical of Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon.

So it’s an incredibly tumultuous moment in Syria, right now, and in this region, as a whole, because the conflict in Syria has been super impactful on everyone thereabouts, to varying degrees, and this ending to this long-lasting civil war could lead to some positive outcomes, like Syrian refugees who have been scattered across neighboring countries being able to return home without facing the threat of violence, and the release of political prisoners from infamous facilities, some of which have already been emptied by the rebels—but especially in the short-term there’s a lot of uncertainty, and it’ll likely be a while before that uncertainty solidifies into something more knowable and predictable, as at the moment, much of the country is still controlled by various militia groups backed by different international actors, including Kurdish-led forces backed by the US, and forces allied with Turkey in the north.

So this change of official governance may shuffle the deck, but rather than stabilizing things, it could result in a new conflict catalyzed by the power vacuum left by the Assad government and its allies, if rebel forces—many of which have been labeled terrorists by governments around the world, which is another wrinkle in all this—if they fail to rally behind one group or individual, and instead start fighting each other for the opportunity to become the country’s new dominant force.

Show Notes

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-hts-jolani.html

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/06/briefing/syria-civil-war-assad.html

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/assads-rule-collapses-in-syria-raising-concerns-of-a-vacuum-95568f13

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/02/world/middleeast/syria-rebels-hts-who-what.html

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/12/07/syria-rebels-biden-intelligence-islamists/

https://apnews.com/article/turkey-syria-insurgents-explainer-kurds-ypg-refugees-f60dc859c7843569124282ea750f1477

https://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-gaza-lebanon-news-7-december-2024-53419e23991cfc14a7857c82f49eb26f

https://apnews.com/article/syria-assad-sweida-daraa-homs-hts-qatar-816e538565d1ae47e016b5765b044d31

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/syria-damascus-eyewitness-assad.html

https://www.nytimes.com/article/syria-civil-war-rebels.html

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/08/world/syria-war-damascus

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ba%27ath_Party

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1963_Syrian_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hafez_al-Assad

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_revolution

https://www.cfr.org/article/syrias-civil-war

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bashar_al-Assad

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fenethylline

https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/border-traffic-how-syria-uses-captagon-to-gain-leverage-over-saudi-arabia?lang=en

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northwestern_Syria_offensive_(December_2019_%E2%80%93_March_2020)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_Syrian_opposition_offensives

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8j99447gj1o

https://apnews.com/article/syria-assad-rebels-war-israel-a8ecceee72a66f4d7e6168d6a21b8dc9

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2024/12/09/world/syria-assad-rebels

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/09/world/middleeast/israel-assad-syria.html

https://apnews.com/article/iran-mideast-proxy-forces-syria-analysis-c853bf613a6d6af7f6aa99b2e60984f8

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/09/briefing/irans-very-bad-year.html

https://apnews.com/article/syria-hts-assad-aleppo-fighting-2be43ee530b7932b123a0f26b158ac22

https://apnews.com/article/syria-insurgents-aleppo-iran-russia-turkey-abff93e4f415ebfd827d49b1a90818e8

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/06/world/middleeast/syria-rebels-hama-homs.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrian_civil_war

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_Spring

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