Economic Implications of Immigration Policies

Our economists Michael Gapen and Sam Coffin discuss how a drop in immigration is tightening labor markets, and what that means for the U.S. economic outlook and Fed policy. 

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Michael Gapen: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michael Gapen, Morgan Stanley's Chief U.S. Economist.

Sam Coffin: And I'm Sam Coffin, Senior Economist on our U.S. Economics research team.

Michael Gapen: Today we're going to have a discussion about the potential economic consequences of the administration’s shift in immigration policies. In particular, we’ll focus much of our attention on the influence that immigration reform is having on the U.S. labor market. And what it means for our outlook on Federal Reserve policy.

It's Friday, June 13th at 9am in New York.

So, Sam, news headlines have been dominated by developments in the President's immigration policies; what is being called by, at least some commentators, as a toughening in his stance.

But I'd like to set the stage first with any new information that you think we've received on border encounters and interior removals. The administration has released new data on that recently that covered at least some of the activity earlier this year. What did it tell you? And did it differ markedly from your expectations?

Sam Coffin: What we saw at first was border encounters falling sharply to 30,000 a month from 200,000 or 300,000 a month last year. It was perhaps a surprise that they fell that sharply. And on the flip side, interior removals turned out to be much more difficult than the administration had suggested. They'd been targeting maybe 500,000 per year in removals, 1500 a day. And we're hitting a third or a half of that pace.

Michael Gapen: So maybe the recent escalation in ICE raids could be in response to this, right? The fact that interior removals have not been as large as some in the administration would desire.

Sam Coffin: That's correct. And we think those efforts will continue. The House Budget Reconciliation Bill, for example, has about $155 billion more in the budget for ICE, a large increase over its current budget. This will likely mean greater efforts at interior removals. About half of it goes to stricter border enforcement. The other half goes to new agents and more operations. We'll see what the final bill looks like, but it would be about a five-fold increase in funding.

Michael Gapen: Okay. So much fewer encounters, meaning fewer migrants entering the U.S., and stepped-up enforcement on interior removals. So, I guess, shifting gears on the back of that data. Two important visa programs have also been in the news. One is the so-called CHNV Parole Program that's allowed Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans to enter the U.S. on parole. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the administration could proceed with removing their immigration status.

We also have immigrants on TPS, or Temporary Protected Status, which is subject to periodic removal; if the administration determines that the circumstances that warranted their immigration into the U.S. are no longer present. So, these would be immigrants coming to the U.S. in response to war, conflict, environmental disasters, hurricanes, so forth.

So, Sam, how do you think about the ramping up of immigration controls in these areas? Is the end of these temporary programs important? How many immigrants are on them? And what would the cancellation of these mean in terms of your outlook for immigration?

Sam Coffin: Yeah, for CHNV Paroles, there are about 500,000 people paroled into the U.S. The Supreme Court ruled that the administration can cancel those paroles. We expect now that those 500,000 are probably removed from the country over the next six months or so. And the temporary protected status; similarly, there are about 800,000 people on temporary protected status. About 600,000 of them have their temporary status revoked at this point or at least revoked sometime soon. And it looks like we'll get a couple hundred thousand in deportations out from that program this year and the rest next year.

The result is net immigration probably falling to 300,000 people this year. We'd expected about a million, when we came into this year, but the faster pace of deportation takes that down. So, 300,000 this year and 300,000 next year, between the reduction in border encounters and the increase in deportations.

Michael Gapen: So that's a big shift from what we thought coming into the year. What does that mean for population growth and growth in the labor force? And how would this compare – just put it in context from where we were coming out of the pandemic when immigration inflows were quite large.

Sam Coffin: Yeah. Population growth before the pandemic was running 0.5 to 0.75 percent per year. With the large increase in immigration, it accelerated 1-1.25 percent during the years of the fastest immigration. At this point, it falls by about a point to 0.3-0.4 percent population growth over the next couple of years.

Michael Gapen: So almost flat growth in the labor force, right? So, translate that into what economists would call a break-even employment rate. How much employment do you need to push the unemployment rate down or push the unemployment rate up?

Sam Coffin: Yeah, so last year – I mean, we have the experience of last year. And last year about 200,000 a month in payroll growth was consistent with a flat unemployment rate. So far this year, that's full on to 160,000-170,000 a month, consistent with a flat unemployment rate. With further reduction in labor force growth, it would probably decline to about 70,000 a month. So much slower payrolls to hold the unemployment rate flat.

Michael Gapen: So, as you know, we've taken the view, Sam, that immigration controls and restrictions will mean a few important things for the economy, right? One is fewer consuming households and softening demand, but the foreign-born worker has a much higher participation rate than domestic workers; about 4 to 5 percentage points higher.

So, a lot less labor force growth, as you mentioned. How have these developments changed your view on exactly how hard it's going to be to push the unemployment rate higher?

Sam Coffin: So, so far this year, payrolls have averaged about 140,000 a month, and the unemployment rate's been going sideways at 4.2 percent. It's been going sideways since – for about nine months now, in fact. We do expect that payroll growth slows over the course of this year, along with the slowing in domestic demand. We have payroll growth falling around 50,000 a month by late in the year; but the unemployment rate going sideways, 4.3 percent this year because of that decline in breakeven payrolls.

For next year, we also have weak payroll growth. We also expect weak payroll growth of about 50,000 a month. But the unemployment rate rising somewhat more to 4.8 percent by the end of the year.

Michael Gapen: So, immigration controls really mean the unemployment rate will rise, but less than you might expect and later than you might expect, right? So that's I guess what we would classify as the cyclical effect of immigration.

But we also think immigration controls and a much slower growth in the labor force means downward pressure on potential. Where are we right now in terms of potential growth and where's that vis-a-vis where we were? And if these immigration controls go into place, where do we think potential growth is going?

Sam Coffin: Well, GDP potential is measured as the sum of productivity growth and growth in trend hours worked. The slower immigration means slower labor force growth and less capacity for hours. We estimated potential growth between 2.5 and 3 percent growth in 2022 to 2024. But we have it falling to 2.0 percent presently – or back to where it was before COVID. If we're right on immigration going forward and we see those faster deportations and the continued stoppage at the border, it could mean potential growth of only 1.5 percent next year.

Michael Gapen: That’s a big change, of course, from where the economy was just, you know, 12 to 18 months ago. And I'd like to circle back to one point that you made in bringing up the recent employment numbers. In the May job report that was released last week, we also saw a decline in labor force participation. It went down two-tenths on the month.

Now, on one hand that may have prevented a rise in the unemployment rate. It was 4.2 but could have been maybe 4.5 percent or so – had the participation rate held constant. So maybe the labor market weakened, and we just don't know it yet. But you have an idea that you've put forward in some of our reports that there might be another explanation behind the drop in the participation rate. What is that?

Sam Coffin: It could be that the threat of increased deportations has created a chilling effect on the participation rate of undocumented workers.

Michael Gapen: So, explain to listeners what we mean by a chilling effect in participation, right? We're not talking about restricting inflows or actual deportations. What are we referring to?

Sam Coffin: Perhaps undocumented workers step out of the workforce temporarily to avoid detection, similar to how people stayed out of the workforce during the pandemic because of fear of infection or need to take care of children or parents. If this is the case, some of the foreign-born population may be stepping out of the labor force for a longer period of time.

Michael Gapen: Right. Which would mean the unemployment rate at 4.2 percent is real and does not mask weakness in the labor market. So, whether it's less in migration, more interior removals, or a chilling effect on participation, then the labor market still stays tight.

Sam Coffin: And this is why we think the Fed moves later but ultimately cuts more. It's a combination of tariffs and immigration.

Michael Gapen: That's right. So, our baseline is that tariffs push inflation higher first, and so the Fed sees that. But if we're right on immigration and your forecast is that the unemployment rate finishes the year at 4.3, then the Fed just stays on hold. And it's not until the unemployment rate starts rising in 2026 that the Fed turns to cuts, right. So, we have cuts starting in March of next year. And the Fed cutting all the way down to 250 to 275.

Well, I think altogether, Sam, this is what we know now. It's certainly a fluid situation. Headlines are changing rapidly, so our thoughts may evolve over time as the policy backdrop evolves. But Sam, thank you for speaking with me.

Sam Coffin: Thank you very much.

Michael Gapen: And thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.