The Problem With Neuroscience

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There is not even a conceivable theory that would get us from the neurons to the what it feels like. And somehow that's getting represented and guiding the body's behavior. I believe that. But the actual phenomena isn't being explained with that kind of explanation. It doesn't get at the phenomenology.

We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?

Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.

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