The Epistemological Problem of Accessing Subjective Experience

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Nagle is not saying phenomenal subjective experience can't be explained in physical terms, therefore there are two kinds of substance. I think he thinks that it's possible that our subjective experience can be explained in material terms, but that we don't have any kind of theory to explain it. And so how would science even begin to approach that? How would a Martian be even approached what it's like to be Tamler? So is the idea that we can be misled? Like David, you might be misled into thinking that you can understand what it’s like to beTamler.

We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?

Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.

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