The Problem of Consciousness

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Nagel says we have to develop such a phenomenology to describe the sonar experiences of bats, but it would be also possible to begin with humans. One might try to develop concepts that could be used to explain to a blind person blind from birth what it was like to see. The loose, intermodal analogies, for example, red is like the sound of a trumpet, which crops up in discussions of the subject or of literal use. But structural features of perception might be more accessible to objective description, even though something would be left out.

We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?

Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.

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