Nagel: Current discussions of the problem here of consciousness give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena, he says. Nagel: I think that part of the problem of getting to this is maybe for some people it's obvious why this poses a problem.
We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?
Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.
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