America's Role in a Shifting Global Landscape

Americans, it’s time to move to Europe! The American geo-strategist Jason Pack anticipated last week’s advice from Simon Kuper and moved to London a few years ago during the first Trump Presidency. Pack, the host of the excellent Disorder podcast, confesses to be thrilled to have escaped MAGA America. He describes the esthetics of contemporary Washington DC as "post-apocalyptic" and criticizes what he sees as the Trump administration's hostile atmosphere, ideological purity tests, and institutional destruction. Contrasting this with Europe's ideological fluidity, Pack warns that Trump's isolationist policies are increasing global disorder by fundamentally undermining America's global leadership role with its erstwhile European allies.

Five Key Takeaways

* Pack left America because he found the "esthetics" of working in policy and media spaces increasingly distasteful, particularly during Trump's first administration.

* He argues that European political systems allow for greater ideological fluidity, while American politics demands strict partisan loyalty.

* Pack describes Washington DC as "post-apocalyptic" with institutions functioning like zombies - going through motions without accomplishing anything meaningful.

* Unlike European populists who want to control institutions, Pack believes Trump's administration aims to destroy government institutions entirely.

* Pack warns that America's deteriorating relationships with traditional allies is creating a "rudderless world" with increased global disorder and potential for conflict.

Full Transcript

Andrew Keen: Hello, everybody. Over the last few days, we've been focusing on the impressions of America, of Trump's America around the world. We had the Financial Times' controversial columnist, Simon Cooper, on the show, arguing that it's the end of the American dream. He had a piece in the FT this week, arguing that it's time to move to Europe for Americans. Not everyone agrees. We had the London-based FT writer Jemima Kelly on the show recently, also suggesting that she hasn't quite given up on America. She is, of course, a Brit living in the UK and looking at America from London. My guest today, another old friend, is Jason Pack. He is the host of the Excellent Disorder podcast. Jason's been on the shows lots of times before. He's an observer of the world's early 21st century disorder. And he is an American living in London. So I'm thrilled that Jason is back on the show. Jason, did you have a chance to look at Simon Cooper's piece? Is it time for Americans to move to Europe?

Jason Pack: You've already moved. Well, he's just popularizing what I've believed for eight or 10 years already. So yeah, I looked at the piece. I really enjoyed your podcast with him. I don't think many Americans will move because most Americans are not particularly global in their outlook. And as disenchanted as they will be, their networks of family and of perspective are in America. Some elites in media and finance will move. But for me, I just found the aesthetics of America becoming distasteful when I worked in D.C. during the first Trump administration. And that's why I pursued a European citizenship.

Andrew Keen: Jason, it's interesting that you choose the word aesthetics. Two thoughts on that. Firstly, America has never been distinguished for its aesthetics. People never came to America for aesthetics. It's never been a particularly beautiful country, a very dynamic place, a very powerful place. So why do you choose that word aesthetic?

Jason Pack: Because for most upper middle class Americans, life under Trump, particularly if they're white and heterosexual, will not change tremendously. But the aesthetics of working in the policy space or in the media will change. Having to deal with all the BS that we hear when we wake up and turn on the TV in the morning, having to interact with Republican nutcase friends who say, oh, the fat is being trimmed by the doge and don't worry about all those people who've been being laid off. The aesthetics of it are ugly and mean. And I have found among some Republican colleagues and friends of mine that they love the vileness of this dog-eat-dog aesthetic.

Andrew Keen: Yeah, it's an interesting way of putting it. And I understand exactly what you're saying. I'm less concerned with the aesthetics as with the reality. And my sense in some ways of what's happening is that the Trump people are obsessed with what you call aesthetics. They want to appear mean. I'm not actually sure that they're quite as mean as they'd like to think they are.

Jason Pack: Oh, they're pretty mean. I mean, people are running around the NIH offices, according to colleagues of mine. And if you're out to the bathroom and your card is inserted in your computer, they go in, they steal the data from your computer.

Andrew Keen: Actually, I take your point. What I meant more by that is that whereas most traditional authoritarian regimes hide their crimes against migrants. They deny wrongdoing. My sense of the Trump regime, or certainly a lot of the people involved in this Trump administration, is that they actually exaggerate it because it gives them pleasure and it somehow benefits their brand. I'm not convinced that they're quite as bad as they'd like to think.

Jason Pack: Oh, I agree with that. They make Schadenfreude a principle. They want to showcase that they enjoy other people's pain. It's a bizarre psychological thing. Trump, for example, wanted to show his virility and his meanness, probably because he's an inner coward and he's not that feral. But we digress in terms of the aesthetics of the individual American wanting to leave. I experienced American government, like the State Department, and then, the bureaucracy of the policy space, say think tanks, or even the government relations trade space, say working for oil companies and government relations, as already authoritarian and ass-kissing in America, and the aesthetics of those industries I have always preferred in Europe, and that's only diverging.

Andrew Keen: One of the things that always struck me about Washington, D.C. It was always uncomfortable as an imperial city. It always has been since the end of the Second World War, with America dominating the world as being one of two or perhaps the only super power in the world. But Washington, DC seems to always have been uncomfortable wearing its imperial mantle cloak in comparison, I think, to cities like London or Paris. I wonder whether, I'm not sure how much time you've spent back in America since Trump came back to power. I wonder if in that sense DC is trying to catch up with London and Paris.

Jason Pack: I actually was giving a briefing in Congress to staffers of the House Foreign Affairs Committee only three weeks ago, and DC seemed post-apocalyptic to me. Many of my favorite restaurants were closing. There was traffic jams at bizarre hours of the day, which I think this is because the Trump people don't know how public transport works and they just ride their cars everywhere. So, yes, it seemed very bizarre being back. You were trying to gauge the interlocutor you were speaking to, were they merely pretending to be on board with Trump's stuff, but they actually secretly think it's ridiculous, or were they true believers? And you had to assess that before you would make your comments. So there is a slide to a kind of, again, neo-authoritarian aesthetic. In my conference, it became clear that the Republican Congressional staffers thought that it was all junk and that Trump doesn't care about Libya and he doesn't understand these issues. But we needed to make lip service in how we expressed our recommendations. So, fascinatingly, various speakers said, oh, there's a transactional win. There's a way that cheaper oil can be gotten here or we could make this policy recommendation appeal to the transactional impulses of the administration. Even though everyone knew that we were speaking in a Democrat echo-chamber where the only Republicans present were anti-Trump Republicans anyway.

Andrew Keen: Describe DC as post-apocalyptic. What exactly then, Jason, is the apocalypse?

Jason Pack: I don't think that the Trump people who are running the show understand how government works and whether you're at state or the NIH or USAID, you're kind of under siege and you're just doing what you're supposed to do and going through the motions. I mean, there's so much of like the zombie apocalypse going on. So maybe it's more zombie apocalypse than regular apocalypse, whereby the institutions are pretending to do their work, but they know that it doesn't accomplish anything. And the Trumpian appointees are kind of pretending to kind of cancel people on DAI, but the institutions are still continuing.

Andrew Keen: I'm going to vulgarize something you said earlier. You talked about Trump wanting to appear bigger than he actually is. Maybe we might call that small penis syndrome. Is that, and then that's my term, Jason, let's be clear, not yours. Maybe it's fair or not. He probably would deny it, but I don't think he'll come on this show. He's more than welcome. Is that also reflected in the people working for him? Is there a bit of a small penis syndrome going on with a lot of the Trump people? Are they small town boys coming to America, coming to D.C. And in all their raison d'état trying to smash up the world that they always envied?

Jason Pack: 100%. If you look at the Tucker Carlson and the Hegset, who went to Princeton in 03, and obviously Tucker Carlsen's WASP elite background is well known, they wanted to make it conventionally and couldn't. Hegson didn't achieve the rank of lieutenant general or colonel or anything in the army. He didn't make it in finance and Vance, obviously had just a minor career in finance, they didn't make the big time except through their hate and resentment of the establishment that succeeded on merit. So, I mean, you could call that small penis syndrome. I think another thing to point out is that many of them have been selected because whether they've been accused of rape or financial crimes or just meanness, they owe the great leader their ability to be in that position. And if he would throw them overboard they're entirely exposed, so that cash patels of the world and the Hexeds of the world serve at the mercy of the great leader, because if they were thrown to the wolves, they could be devoured for their misdeeds. And I think that that makes it a place where it's all about loyalty to the boss. But maybe we could pivot to the initial topic about how I think Europe is a place where you can reinvent yourself as an individual now. Certainly in the political and ideology space, and America really hasn't been for much of my left.

Andrew Keen: Yeah, it's interesting. And this is how actually our conversation you're doing. You're a much better podcast host than I am, Jason. You're reminding us of the real conversation rather than getting led down one Trumpian byway or another. I did a show recently on why I still believe in the American dream. And I was interviewed by my friend, David Maschiottra, another old friend of the show. And I suggested I originally came to America to reinvent myself and that's always been the platform with which Europeans have come to America. You're suggesting that perhaps the reverse is true now.

Jason Pack: I really enjoyed that episode. I thought you were a great guest and he was a natural host. But I realized how it wasn't speaking to me. Many of my European friends who work in law, finance, tech, startup, you know, they finished their degrees in Italy or in England and they moved to America. And that's where they raised venture capital and they go on the exact success trajectory that you explained and they fetishize, oh my God, when my green card is gonna come through, I'm gonna have this big party. That never resonated with me because America was never a land of opportunity for me. And it hit me in hearing your podcast that that's because what I've aspired to is to work in government slash think tank or to be a professional expert. And if you don't ally yourself with one of the major political movements, you're always branded and you can never move ahead. I'll give a few examples if you're interested in the way that my trying to be in the center has meant that I could never find a place in America.

Andrew Keen: Absolutely. So you're suggesting that your quote-unquote American dream could only be realized in Europe.

Jason Pack: So I moved to the Middle East to serve my country after 9/11. If Gore had been elected president, I likely would have joined the army or the Marines or something. But Bush was president and I knew I needed to do this on my own. So, you know, I lived in Beirut, then I went to Iraq. Where did you graduate from, Jason? I graduated from Williams in 2002, but I was changing my studies as soon as the 9-11 happened. I stopped my senior thesis in biology and I pivoted to doing the Middle East. I thought the Middle East was going to be the next big thing. But I didn't realize that if you wanted to do it your own way, for example, living in Syria prior to working in government, then you couldn't get those security clearances. But in the UK, that's not really a problem. If you go to Leeds or Oxford and you got sent to study Arabic in Syria, you can work for the UK government, but not in America. If your went and did that your own way, your loyalties would be questioned. You wouldn't get your security clearance. I got an internship to work at the U.S. Embassy in Muscat, where I fell afoul of my supervisors because I was someone who wanted to speak in Arabic with Omanis and, for example, go to hear prayers at the mosque and really be a part of the society. And I was told, don't do that. But aren't we here to understand about Oman? And they're like, no, it's really important to mostly socialize with people at the embassy. But my British colleagues, they were out there in Omani society, and they were, for example, really participating in stuff because the relationship between the Omanis and the Brits and the Americans is a happy one. That's just a small example, but I wanna make the kind of further point, which is that if you wanna get promoted in think tank world in America, it doesn't matter whether it's Cato or Heritage on the right or New America Foundation or Middle East Institute on the left. You have to buy in hook, line, and sinker to the party line of those institutions. And if that party line is DEI, as it was at the Middle East Institute when I was there, and you're a white heterosexual male, you're not going to get promoted. And if, for example, you want to then interact with some Zionist think tank like FDD, the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, I was going to a fellowship there for work that I had done about monitoring ISIS in Libya, and they had proposed a funding line for my project, which was just technically reading jihadi Facebook posts and monitoring them. And then they did some more research on me, ironically, after we had already signed the funds. And they said, oh, we're so sorry, we are going to have to pull back on this. We are going have to pay you a kill fee. We are really, really sorry. And I came to understand why that was. And it was because I had advocated that the Iranians should be allowed to get the bomb so that they could have mutually assured destruction theory with Israel.

Andrew Keen: Well, Jason, I take your point, but everyone has their own narrative when it comes to why their career didn't did or didn't take off and how they know what that doesn't happen in Europe. I'm just making a contrast. Let me just come back to my argument about America, which is it isn't necessarily as straightforward as perhaps at first it seems. I think one of the reasons why America has always been a great place for reinvention is because of the absence of memory.

Jason Pack: No, but what I'm saying is Google will inspire on you, and if you're not within the ideological cadre, you cannot progress at these kind of institutions.

Andrew Keen: Okay, I take your point on that, but thinking more broadly, America is a place where you can, I've done so many different things in this country from being a scholar to being an internet entrepreneur to being an expert on technology to being a critic of technology to being against podcasts, to being a podcaster. And you can get away, and I've failed in practically all of them, if not all of them, but the fact is that because people don't have memory, you can keep on doing different things and people won't say, well, how can you get away with this? Last week you were doing X. My sense, and maybe correct me if I'm wrong about London or Europe, is there is much more memory. You can't get away with perpetual reinvention in Europe as you can in the U.S. and maybe that's because of the fact that in your language, living in Europe with its memory and respect for memory is more aesthetically pleasing. So I'm not suggesting this is as simple as it might appear.

Jason Pack: I agree with that last point, but I think I'm trying to bring something else out. In spheres like tech or podcasting, there isn't credentialism in America. And therefore, if you're just good at it, you don't need the credentials and you can get going. And you and other Europeans who had great merit, as you do, have benefited from that. And in Europe, you might run up against credentialism, but, oh, but you didn't work at the BBC, so you don't get the job. I'm making a different point about ideological purity within the very specific realms of, say, working for an American presidential candidate or briefing a policymaker or rising up at a think tank. I have briefed labor MPs, Lib Dem MPs and Tory MPs. And they don't ask my politics. I can go in there and get a meeting with Keir Starmer's people on Libya, and they don't care about the fact that I want him to do something slightly different. Criticized him and praised him at different times on my podcast, try having an influence with some Trump people and then say, Oh, well, you know, I really think that I can help you on this Libya policy, but I happened to run a fairly anti-Trump podcast. No, you just can't get the briefing because America is about ideological purity tests and getting your ticket punch in the government and think tank and exporting professions, and therefore it's not some place you can reinvent yourself. If you're clearly an anti-Trump Republican McCainite, you can't all of a sudden become an AOC Democrat for the purpose of one meeting. But in Europe you can, because you can be a Lib Dem like Liz Truss and then be a Tory Prime Minister. And no one cares what my position on these topics are when they ask me to brief Keir Starmer's people and that's something that I find so fantastic about Europe.

Andrew Keen: Yeah, it's interesting. I mean, you know this stuff better than I do. But isn't someone like Truss rooted in ideological purity? She was a Lib Dem when she was at Oxford. Yeah, but that was a long time ago. I can reverse that, Jason, and say, well, when Trump was young, he ran around with Bill and Hillary Clinton, he went to their wedding, he funded them. He never was even a Republican until 2014 or 15. So, I mean, he's an example of the very ideological fluidity that you idealize in Europe.

Jason Pack: I agree with your point. I think that he's an exception there and he wouldn't have allowed it from his staffers. They now have essentially loyalty tested everything. It's not a place where if you were Democrat with ideas that would benefit the Trumpian establishment, you can be heard. I'll give an example. I like the Abraham Accords and I have a colleague who wants to help extend the Abraham Accords to Pakistan, she can only work with ideologically pure Republicans in the pitching of this idea. She can't work with someone like me because I don't have the ideological purity, even though this is a nonpartisan idea and it should be embraced if you can get the Trumpians to be interested in it. But that's not how America works and it has not been. Reagan, of course, if you said that you like taxes, and I'm someone who likes taxes and I don't believe in the Laffer curve, and neoliberalism is a sham, you couldn't be on that economic team. So there are different ideological tests. Trump was never a politician, so he's not an expert like me in the expert class where we've been litmus tested our whole careers.

Andrew Keen: Interesting. Jason, yesterday I was talking to someone who was thinking of hiring me to do a speech in Europe to a business group, and we were discussing the kinds of speeches I could give, and one of the things I suggested was a defense of America, suggesting that we can believe in America and that everyone's wrong. And these people have hired me before. I've often made provocative counterintuitive arguments, there was a little bit of a silence and they said, you can't make that speech in Europe. No one will take it seriously to a business community. What's generally, I mean, you travel a lot, you talk to lots of different people. Have people really given up on the promise of America, particularly within the establishment, the business establishment, the political establishment?

Jason Pack: I don't know. I think that many Europeans still think that this is a passing phase. I will comment on the fact that I do not see anti-Americanism in my daily life as a result of Trump, the way that, for example, you do see anti-Semitism as a results of Netanyahu's policy. The individual Jew is tarred by horrible things happening in Gaza, but the individual American is not tarred by the deporting and illegal detentions and sacking of people by Doge because people in Poland or London or even the Middle East understand that you're likely to not be a Trump supporter and they're not targeting you as an individual as a result of that. So I think they believe in the promise of America and they still might like to move to America. But on individual level if you want to be a political animal inside the beast of campaigns, rising up to be a David Axelrod kind of figure. America has been a place of these litmus tests. Whereas in Europe, you know, I feel that there's tremendous fluidity because in Italy they have so and so many political parties and in Germany, what's the distinction between the SPD at one moment in the CDU and the Greens and there's a tradition of coalitions that allows the individual to reinvent himself.

Andrew Keen: One of the things that came up with Cooper, and he's certainly no defender of Marine Le Pen or Meloni in Italy, but he suggested that the Trump people are far to the right of Le Pen and Meloni. Would you agree with that?

Jason Pack: Because they want to break down institutions, whereas Le Pen and Meloni simply want to conquer the institutions and use them. They're not full-blown, disordering neopopulists, to use the language of my disorder podcast. When Meloni is in power, she loves the Italian state and she wants it to function merely with her ideological slant. Whereas the Trumpians, they have a Bannonite wing, they don't simply wanna have a MAGA agenda, use the U.S. Government. No, they want to break the Department of Agriculture. They want to break the EPA. They simply want to destroy our institutions. And there's no European political party that wants that. Maybe on the fringe like reform, but reform probably doesn't even want that.

Andrew Keen: But Jason, we've heard so much about how the Bannonites idealized Orban in Hungary. A lot of people believe that Project 2025 was cooked up in Budapest trying to model America on Orban. Is there any truth to that? I mean, are the Trump people really re-exporting Orbanism back into the United States?

Jason Pack: That there is some truth, but it can be overplayed. It can go back further to Berlusconi. It's the idea that a particularly charismatic political leader can come to dominate the media landscape by either having a state media channel in the Berlusconi sense or cowing media coverage to make it more favorable, which is something that Orban has done geniusly, and then doling out contracts and using the state for patronage, say, Orban's father's construction business and all those concrete soccer stadiums. There is an attempt potentially in Trump land to, through an ideological project, cow the media and the checks and balances and have a one-party state with state media. I think it's going to be difficult for them to achieve, but Chuck Carlson and others and Bannon seem to want that.

Andrew Keen: You were on Monocle recently talking about the Pope's death. J.D. Vance, of course, is someone who apparently had a last, one of the last conversations with the Pope. Pope wasn't particularly, Pope Francis wasn't particularly keen on him. Bannon and Vance are both outspoken Catholics. What's your take on the sort of this global religious movement on the part of right-wing Catholics, and how does it fit in, not only to the death of Francis, but perhaps the new Pope?

Jason Pack: It's a very interesting question. I'm not a right-wing Catholic, so I'm really not in a position to...

Andrew Keen: I thought you were Jason, that's why you could always come on the show.

Jason Pack: I think that they don't have the theological bona fides to say that what they call Catholicism is Catholicism because obviously Jesus turned the other cheek, you know, and Jesus didn't want to punish his enemies and make poor black or Hispanic women suffer. But there is an interesting thing that has been going on since 1968, which is that there was a backlash against the student protests and free love and the condom and all the social changes that that brought about. And Catholics have been at the forefront, particularly Catholic institutions, in saying this has gone too far and we need to use religion to retake our society. And if we don't, no one will have children and we will lose out and the Muslims and Africans will rule the roost because they're having babies. And that right-wing Catholicism is caught up in the moral panic and culture wars since 1968. What I argued in the monocle interview that you referenced from earlier today is something quite different, which is that the Catholic Church has a unique kind of authority, and that that unique kind of authority can be used to stand up against Trump, Bannon, Orban, and other neopopulists in a way that, say, Mark Carney or Keir Starmer cannot, because if Mark Kearney and Keir Stormer say, you guys are not sufficiently correctly American and you're not following the American laws, blah, blah blah, the kind of Americans who support Trump are not convinced by that because they say, these are just, you know, pinko Brits and Canadians. I don't even care about Mark Kearny, but it's quite different if the next Pontiff is someone who comes not only from the school of Francis, but maybe more so is a great communicator vested in the real doctrines of the church, the Lateran Councils and Vatican too, and can say, actually this given thing that Trump has just said is not in line with the principles of Jesus. It's not inline with what the Vatican has said about, for example, migration or social equity. And I find that that is a unique opportunity because even the right-wing Catholics have to acknowledge the Pope and Christian doctrine and the ability of the Catholic hierarchy to say this is not in line with our teachings. So I think there's a very interesting opportunity right now.

Andrew Keen: Perhaps that brings to mind Stalin's supposedly famous remarks to Churchill at Potsdam when they were talking about the Pope. Stalin said to Churchill, the Pope, how many divisions does he have? In other words, it's all about ideology, morality, and ultimately it doesn't really. It's the kind of thing that perhaps if some of the Trump people were as smart as Stalin, they might make the same remark.

Jason Pack: That was a physical war, and the Pope didn't have divisions to sway the battles in World War II, but this is an ideological or an influence war. And the Pope, if you've just seen from media coverage over the last week, is someone who has tremendous media influence. And I do think that the new pontiff could, if he wanted to, stand up to the moral underpinnings of Trump and pull even the most right-wing Catholics away from a Trumpian analysis. Religion is supposed to be about, because Jesus didn't say punish your enemies. Don't turn the other cheek and own the libs. Jesus said something quite different than that. And it will be the opportunity of the new Catholic leader to point that out.

Andrew Keen: I'm not sure if you've seen the movie Conclave, which was very prescient, made by my dear London friend, or at least produced by Tessa Ross at House Productions. But I wonder in these new conversations whether in the debates about who should the new Pope be, they'll mull over TikTok presence.

Jason Pack: I hope they will. And I want to point out something that many people probably are not aware, which is that the College of Cardinals that constitutes the conclave does not have to pick one of their member to be pope. For the last six centuries, they have always chosen one of their own number, but they don't have to. So they could choose someone who has not only an ability to make great TikToks, but someone who can put forth a vision about climate change, about tax equity, for example, maybe about AI and what constitutes humanity from within the Catholic tradition, but reaching new faithful. And I think that they might actually consider we're doing this because in places like Western Europe, attendance is down, but in Eastern Europe and Latin America, it isn't. And in Africa, it's surging. So they may want to reach new millennials in Gen Z with a new message, but one which is rooted in their tradition. And I think that that would be a great counterbalance to what Trump and his ilk have done to how media coverage place things like climate change and migrants these days.

Andrew Keen: Speaking of Trump and his ilk, Jason, lots of conversations here about the first cracks in his monolith. Speaking to me from London, I always look at the front page of The Telegraph, a conservative English newspaper. I refuse to give the money, so I never actually read any of the pieces. But I'm always curious as to the traditional conservative media attitude to Trump. What do not so much the Conservative Party, which seems to be in crisis in the UK, but what does Conservative media, Conservative thinkers, what's their take currently on Trump? Are you seeing a crack? Are people seeing this guy's absolutely insane and that the tariff policy is going to make all of us, everybody in the world poorer?

Jason Pack: Well, Trump has always been a vote loser in the UK. So that even though Farage brags about his relationship, it isn't something that gets him more votes for reform. And whether it's Sunak or Badnak, and Badnak is the current leader of the Tory party, which is an opposition, she can't so closely associate herself with Trump because he's not popular in even right-wing British circles. However, the Tory media, like the telegraph and the spectator, they love the idea that he's owning the Libs. We talked about Schadenfreude, we talked about attacking the woke. The spectator has taken a very anti-woke turn over the last five to 10 years. And they love the ideal of pointing out the hypocrisies of the left and the effeminacy of it and all of that. And that gets them more clicks. So from a media perspective, there is a way in which the Murdoch media is always going to love the click bait, New York post bait of the Trump presidency. And that applies very much, you know, with the sun and the Daily Mail and the way that they cover media in this country.

Andrew Keen: Although I was found in the U.S. That perhaps the newspaper that has been most persistently and usefully critical of Trump is the Wall Street Journal, which is owned by Murdoch.

Jason Pack: Yeah, but that's a very highbrow paper, and I think that it's been very critical of the tariff policy and it said a lot of intelligent things about Trump's early missteps. It doesn't reach the same people as the New York Post or the Daily Mail do.

Andrew Keen: Finally, Jason, let's go back to Disorder, your excellent podcast. You started it a couple of years ago before this new Trump madness. You were always one of the early people on this global disorder. How much more disordered can the world become? Of course, it could become more disorded in terms of war. In late April 2025, is the world more disordered than it was in April 2024, when Biden was still in power? I mean, we still have these wars in Gaza, in Ukraine, doesn't seem as if that much has changed, or am I wrong?

Jason Pack: I take your point, but I'm using disorder in a particularly technical sense in a way by which I mean the inability of major powers to coordinate together for optimal solutions. So in the Biden days of last year, yes, the Ukraine and Gaza wars may be waging, but if Jake Sullivan or Blinken were smarter or more courageous, they could host a summit and work together with their French and British and Argentinian allies. Put forth some solutions. The world is more disordered today because it doesn't have a leader. It doesn't have institutions, the UN or NATO or the G7 where those solutions on things like the Ukraine war attacks could happen. And you may say, but wait, Jason, isn't Trump actually doing more leadership? He's trying to bring the Ukrainians and the Russians to the table. And I would say he isn't. They're not proposing actual solutions. They don't care about solving underlying issues. They're merely trying to get media wins. He wants the Japanese to come to Washington to have the semblance of a new trade deal, not a real trade deal. He's trying to reorder global finance in semblance, not in reality. So the ability to come to actual solutions through real coordinating mechanisms where I compromise with you is much weaker than it was last year. And on the Disorder Podcast, we explore all these domains from tax havens to cryptocurrency to cyber attacks. And I think that listeners of Keen On would really enjoy how we delve into those topics and try to see how they reflect where we're at in the global system.

Andrew Keen: Yeah, it's a strongly, I would strongly agree with you. I would encourage all keen on listeners to listen to Disorder and vice versa if this gets onto the Disorder podcast. What about the China issue? How structural is the tariff crisis, if that's the right word, gonna change US relations with China? Is this the new Cold War, Jason?

Jason Pack: I'm not an economist, but from what I've been told by the economists I've interviewed on my podcast, it's absolutely completely game changing because whether it's an Apple iPhone or most pieces of manufactured kit that you purchase or inputs into American manufacturing, it's assembled everywhere and the connections between China and America are essential to the global economy. Work and it's not like you can all of a sudden move those supply chains. So this trade war is really a 1930s style beggar thy neighbor approach to things and that led to and deepened the great depression, right? So I am very worried. I had the sense that Trump might back off because he does seem to be very sensitive to the markets. But maybe this is such an ideological project and, you know, Andrew Ross Sorkin on CNBC was just saying, even though he's willing to back off if the T bill rate changes, he thinks that his strategy is working and that he's going to get some deals. And that terrifies me because that's not what's happening. It isn't working. And God forbid that they'll push this to its logical conclusion and cause a new recession or depression.

Andrew Keen: I know you've got to run Jason. So final question, let's return to where we began with America and the changing nature of America. Your last episode of Disorder was with Corey Sharpe, who is a very, very good and one of Washington DC's, I think, smartest foreign policy analysts. She asks, what's America without allies? If this continues, what, indeed, I mean, you're happy in London, so I don't sound like you're coming back, whatever. But what will America become if indeed all these traditional allies, the UK, France, Germany, become, if not enemies, certainly just transactional relationships? What becomes of America without allies?

Jason Pack: Wow, great question. I'm gonna treat this in two parts, the American cultural component and then the structural geopolitical component. I'm a proud American. Culturally, I work on Sundays. I don't take any holiday. I get angry at contractors who are not direct. I am going to be American my whole life and I want an American style work ethic and I wanna things to function and the customer to always be right. So I didn't move to Europe to get European stuff in that way, and I think America will still be great at new inventions and at hard work and at all of that stuff and will still, the NFL will still be a much better run sports league than European sports leagues. Americans are great at certain things. The problem is what if America's role in the world as having the reserve currency, coordinating the NATO allies. If that's eviscerated, we're just going to be living more and more in the global enduring disorder, as Corey Schacke points out, which is that the Europeans don't know how to lead. They can't step up because they don't have one prima inter Paris. And since the decline of the British Empire, the British haven't learned how, for example, to coordinate the Europeans for the defense of Ukraine or for making new missile technologies or dealing with the defense industry. So we're just dealing with a rudderless world. And that's very worrying because there could be major conflict. And then I just have to hope that a new American administration, it could be a Republican one, but I think it just can't be a Trumpian one, will go back to its old role of leadership. I haven't lost hope in America. I've just lost hope in this current administration.

Andrew Keen: Well, I haven't lost hope in Jason Pack. He is an ally of ours at Keen On. He's the host of the Excellent Disorder podcast. Jason, it's always fun to have you on the show. So much to discuss and no doubt there will be much more over the summer, so we'll have you back on in the next month or two. Thank you so much. Keep well. Stay American in London. Thank you again.

Jason Pack: It was a great pleasure. Thanks, Andrew. See you then.

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