The Shah was riding high really until 1977 he and the very fact that he thought of one state a one state party was a good idea. He was so kind of arrogant to you know and contemptuous of everybody and everyone anyone who dared to think otherwise. And with this is also something we haven't actually mentioned he was just spending inordinate amounts on American predominantly American but not only American arms. So these sort of long-term kind of structural kind of fishers and cleavages are twinned with this personalization of power where the Shah can no longer deflect, says Gorna.
Featuring Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi and Golnar Nikpour on the history of modern Iran. This is the third episode in our four-part series. We pick up in the wake of the US-British 1953 coup against Mossadegh, assess the Shah's repression and attempts to manufacture consent through passive revolution, and then close by laying out the 1979 Islamic Revolution in all of its wild complexity.
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