
Abstraction & Idealization: AI's Plato Problem [Mazviita Chirimuuta]
Machine Learning Street Talk (MLST)
Abstraction and Idealization Defined
Mazviita contrasts abstraction and idealization, explaining how scientists ignore or attribute false properties to simplify models.
Professor Mazviita Chirimuuta joins us for a fascinating deep dive into the philosophy of neuroscience and what it really means to understand the mind.*What can neuroscience actually tell us about how the mind works?* In this thought-provoking conversation, we explore the hidden assumptions behind computational theories of the brain, the limits of scientific abstraction, and why the question of machine consciousness might be more complicated than AI researchers assume.Mazviita, author of *The Brain Abstracted,* brings a unique perspective shaped by her background in both neuroscience research and philosophy. She challenges us to think critically about the metaphors we use to understand cognition — from the reflex theory of the late 19th century to today's dominant view of the brain as a computer.*Key topics explored:**The problem of oversimplification* — Why scientific models necessarily leave things out, and how this can sometimes lead entire fields astray. The cautionary tale of reflex theory shows how elegant explanations can blind us to biological complexity.*Is the brain really a computer?* — Mazviita unpacks the philosophical assumptions behind computational neuroscience and asks: if we can model anything computationally, what makes brains special? The answer might challenge everything you thought you knew about AI.*Haptic realism* — A fresh way of thinking about scientific knowledge that emphasizes interaction over passive observation. Knowledge isn't about reading the "source code of the universe" — it's something we actively construct through engagement with the world.*Why embodiment matters for understanding* — Can a disembodied language model truly understand? Mazviita makes a compelling case that human cognition is deeply entangled with our sensory-motor engagement and biological existence in ways that can't simply be abstracted away.*Technology and human finitude* — Drawing on Heidegger, we discuss how the dream of transcending our physical limitations through technology might reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of what it means to be a knower.This conversation is essential viewing for anyone interested in AI, consciousness, philosophy of mind, or the future of cognitive science. Whether you're skeptical of strong AI claims or a true believer in machine consciousness, Mazviita's careful philosophical analysis will give you new tools for thinking through these profound questions.---TIMESTAMPS:00:00:00 The Problem of Generalizing Neuroscience00:02:51 Abstraction vs. Idealization: The "Kaleidoscope"00:05:39 Platonism in AI: Discovering or Inventing Patterns?00:09:42 When Simplification Fails: The Reflex Theory00:12:23 Behaviorism and the "Black Box" Trap00:14:20 Haptic Realism: Knowledge Through Interaction00:20:23 Is Nature Protean? The Myth of Converging Truth00:23:23 The Computational Theory of Mind: A Useful Fiction?00:27:25 Biological Constraints: Why Brains Aren't Just Neural Nets00:31:01 Agency, Distal Causes, and Dennett's Stances00:37:13 Searle's Challenge: Causal Powers and Understanding00:41:58 Heidegger's Warning & The Experiment on Children---REFERENCES:Book:[00:01:28] The Brain Abstractedhttps://mitpress.mit.edu/9780262548045/the-brain-abstracted/[00:11:05] The Integrated Action of the Nervous Systemhttps://www.amazon.sg/integrative-action-nervous-system/dp/9354179029[00:18:15] The Quest for Certainty (Dewey)https://www.amazon.com/Quest-Certainty-Relation-Knowledge-Lectures/dp/0399501916[00:19:45] Realism for Realistic People (Chang)https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/realism-for-realistic-people/ACC93A7F03B15AA4D6F3A466E3FC5AB7<truncated, see ReScript>---RESCRIPT:https://app.rescript.info/public/share/A6cZ1TY35p8ORMmYCWNBI0no9ChU3-Kx7dPXGJURvZ0PDF Transcript:https://app.rescript.info/api/public/sessions/0fb7767e066cf712/pdf


