The revelation principle says that if you want to maximize revenue, then you can actually just consider auctions that request bids from bearers. So it's basically saying you don't really need to have a lot of complexity on the auction. Although the initial auction was credible, the resulting auction after you apply the revelation principle might not be credible because in the proof it really requires this assumption that you trust the auction year.
In this week's episode Anna Rose and Tarun Chitra explore the topic of auctions with guests Kshitij Kulkarni, PHD student at Berkeley’s EECS department and Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Postdoctoral Fellow in Computer Science at Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied Sciences.
They discuss the history of auctions, both in the real world and in blockchain, and go on to cover more recent blockchain uses, such as MEV and NFT auctions. They review the incentives of both auction holders and the participants as well as how this incentive design can influence the effectiveness of the auctions themselves.
Here are some additional links for this episode:
- Credibility and Incentives in Gradual Dutch Auctions by Kulkarni, Ferreira and Chitra
- Credible, Optimal Auctions via Blockchains by Kulkarni, Ferreira and Chitra
- Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake by Kulkarni, Ferreira and Chitra
- Credible Auctions: A Trilemma by Akbarpour and Li
- Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments by Ferreira and Weinberg
- Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for all Distributions by Essaidi, Ferreira and Weinberg
- Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market by Ferreira, Moroz, Parkes and Stern
- Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness by Ferreira and Weinberg
- Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake by Ferreira, Hahn, Weinberg, Yu
- Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules by Ferreira and Parkes
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