I think it's very difficult to measure these things, obviously, but the direction seems clear. The real problem here is the demand side. So when you're looking at the premiums, my suspicion is you're overwhelmingly picking up the demand for lawyers via regulation. And so that's why we focus on deregulating entry. That's a mechanism where we think, okay, if in a number of these areas, we start seeing far less that government can deliver in terms of premium to lawyers, they look, there's no point in us trying to support these things anymore. Perhaps we can sort of see a positive direction in reform.
Clifford Winston of the Brookings Institution talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about the market for lawyers and the role of lawyers in the political process. Drawing on a new co-authored book, First Thing We Do, Let's Deregulate All the Lawyers, Winston argues that restrictions on the supply of lawyers and increases in demand via government regulation artificially boost lawyers' salaries. Deregulation of the supply (by eliminating licensing) would lower price and encourage innovation.