How clever fishermen outsmarted a uniform price auction | with Alex Teytelboym
Game Changer - the game theory podcast
00:00
Uniform Price Auctions - Is There a Collaborative Bidding Problem?
The idea that you can do this in a uniform price auction is as old as the first theoretical analysis of the uniform price auction. The key thing that was allowing the feroese fishermen to do what they did was predictability of ply. In every auction, the stakes are really high and people try to figure out ways of splitting up the market at a low cost. But sometimes it's very hard to do these kinds of arctions because often the lots are indivisible,. so you can imagine a situation where you have five bidders and everyone wants two blocks on the same paper. And even though we're talking about auctions for government bonds, there could still be collusion going on between
Transcript
Play full episode
