Well, you mentioned the irony that in September of 98, Lehman's at the table, they were vulnerable. The stock price really got hammered during that period of time. They pwned up, I think it was 100. They backstop to ring fence, the LDCM risk and it took six to 12 months to unwind that portfolio. There was a whole auction process, but they did stabilize the market. But literally 10 years later, in September of 2008, Lehman had its turn. And so you've also written a book called The End of Wall Street on the 2008 crisis. What if any are the parallels that you see from the LDCM event to the big one, the GFC?

First, I'll just say it's remarkable to me that Dick Fogg was at the table, Lehman at LCCM, Jimmy Kane for Bear Stearns was there. Anybody who had known the parallels of skating on tooth and eyes, it was over the gentleman. Parallel, these trades, Lehman trades, they basically held, and Bear held way too many mortgage securities. They had way too much leverage. That was the biggest parallel. I think they were also way over reliant on models, which told them that these mortgage securities, which is a member of, were sliced and diced in all sorts of ways. But you could take a risky mortgage, slice it up, package it with others and so on, get a package of mortgages, which in their totality would not be risky. And the models on housing prices, that they wouldn't be risky because housing prices had never moved. The only move sideways must was down. So they were way over leverage. When assets, I don't think they're really understood for which they presume a level of safety and not based on fundamentals, but just based on the past history, which was relatively brief, mortgage securities over the years trade in earnest in the, what, early 80s, I believe. And they went over a cliff. There were other things involved in 2008 as well, which I think is why we were more complicated. There were more causes. The LTCM, I think, is an easier one to grasp because its story of risk refined to its essentials. And in 2008, there was the story of all these mortgage brokers who were inducing people to take so-called liar loans, not being upfront about their income and so on, adding to the risk in these mortgages and the issuance of sales, the packages not care. And there was the added aspect of the rating agencies, not really doing their job. And there was the added aspect of United States housing policy and pushing, changing, and spreading to push loans out the door at people who didn't have financial rail at all to withstand them. And the effects were far greater. We only talked about LTCM is almost the pure financial play, people on Main Street, they hadn't heard about LTCM, and most people still have never heard of LTCM. It's a, to my way of saying, that's a certain thing, it's a financial market, but the story of 2008 was very different. The asset and question there was what for most Americans is not only the most significant assets, they're only principal financial assets. So when vast numbers of these appear to be unworthy or insolvent, it was not only a walk-through event, it led to the worst recession, economic recession, mainstream recession since the 1930s.