Intro

In this interview, we talk to Dan Everett about the life and work of the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce and Everett’s application of Peirce’s ideas to create a Peircean linguistics.

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References for Episode 38

Cole, David. 2023. “The Chinese Room Argument”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023 Edition), eds. Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/chinese-room/

Everett, Daniel L. 2012. Language: The Cultural Tool. New York: Pantheon Books.

Everett, Daniel L. 2017. How Language Began: The Story of Humanity’s Greatest Invention. New York: Liveright.

Everett, Daniel L. 2023. ‘Underspecified temporal semantics in Pirahã: Compositional transparency and semiotic inference’, in Understanding Human Time, ed. Kasia M. Jaszczolt, pp. 276–318. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Transcript by Luca Dinu

JMc: Hi, I’m James McElvenny, and you’re listening to the History and Philosophy of the Language Sciences podcast, [00:15] online at hiphilangsci.net. There you can find links and references to [00:19] all the literature we discuss. Today we’re joined by Dan Everett. Dan is Professor [00:25] of Cognitive Sciences at Bentley College in Massachusetts. His background is in field [00:31] linguistics and linguistic theory, and he’s of course best known for his work with the [00:37] Pirahã in the Brazilian Amazon. The conclusions he’s drawn about the structure of the Pirahã [00:43] language have significant consequences for much of mainstream linguistic theory, especially [00:49] for generative grammar in the Chomskyan tradition. These consequences have been debated extensively. [00:56]

At the moment, Dan is researching most keenly the life and work of the American philosopher [01:01] Charles Sanders Peirce. This project is not unrelated to his work on Pirahã and his previous [01:08] contributions to linguistic theory. These various threads are now coming together in Dan’s proposal [01:15] for a Peircean linguistics, and this is what he’s going to talk to us about today.

So to set the [01:22] scene for us, can you tell us, who was C.S. Peirce? What were his intellectual contributions, [01:29] and why are they important?

DE: I’m actually writing a biography of Charles Sanders Peirce for [01:35] Princeton University Press, and I’ve been interested in Peirce now for about six years [01:42] seriously, and before that I did cite him quite a bit in my How Language Began from 2017 and [01:51] also in my Language: The Cultural Tool from 2012, but I got seriously interested in Peirce [01:59] some years later. The first time I heard about Peirce, and then I’ll get to who he is, was [02:05] actually from Chomsky, who called him his favorite philosopher and talked about the [02:10] Peircean concept of abduction, which is the formalization of hypothesis formation. [02:16]

Charles Peirce was born in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to Benjamin and Sarah Peirce in 1839. [02:26] Benjamin was for 50 years professor of mathematics at Harvard and was considered the leading [02:33] mathematician in the United States and the person who put U.S. science on a nearly equal footing [02:41] with the European science of mid-19th century, and he was a very interesting person in his own [02:47] right, founder of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Association for the Advancement [02:53] of Science, co-founder.

Charles was raised in Harvard Yard. When he was a boy, they lived [03:02] actually in Harvard Yard, and his friends and his father’s friends were some of the leading [03:07] intellectuals of the United States, and later as Peirce grew, his own friends became leading [03:15] intellectuals and friends of people such as Thomas Huxley and others.

But Charles initially became [03:23] interested in logic and chemistry, and for most of his life… The only degree that he actually ever held [03:33] was in chemistry. He held a master’s degree and a bachelor’s degree in chemistry from [03:41] Harvard, and he was then hired as an astronomer and as a geophysicist with what was then called [03:51] the U.S. Coastal Survey, which is now NOAA. They actually launched a ship called C.S. Peirce. [03:59] So he got mainly interested in logic, but he was also one of the greatest polymaths in history. He [04:07] was the first person in the United States to do experimental psychology. He was the inventor of [04:15] propositional and first-order logic with quantifiers, nearly simultaneously with Frege. [04:20] They didn’t know about each other’s work. Peirce is also known as the inventor of American pragmatism, [04:26] or just pragmatism. That’s a philosophical school of America that is often associated with [04:30] William James. He is the inventor of semiotics, and there’s evidence that Saussure actually [04:38] was able to consult some of Peirce’s work on semiotics before he came out with his own work [04:44] on semiotics, which was very different and designed for a very different purpose. [04:51]

So in mathematics, Peirce took his father’s place as the number one mathematician in the United [04:57] States, and there are many articles on mathematics. So he was a phenomenal polymath. He was one of the [05:03] leading Egyptologists in the world, and he was… In his notebooks I have copied, there are analyses of [05:12] Tagalog syntax, and he was very interested in languages. He published about 127 articles on [05:21] linguistics or linguistic themes, including the first-ever phonetic study of Shakespearean [05:27] pronunciation. His father had produced the first formal study of phonetics in the United States, [05:33] or one of the first.

So he was this astounding person, but when he died, [05:40] he never held an academic post except for four years at Johns Hopkins. He was one of the first [05:46] professors hired at the new University of Johns Hopkins, but Peirce was a very egocentric person. [05:54] He thought he was smarter than everybody else. He probably was. He didn’t like to take orders. [05:59] So he lost his job at Johns Hopkins. Also from the fact that he liked to drink, and he was seen [06:06] coming out of a hotel with a woman who was not his wife, and that really got the trustees of [06:11] Johns Hopkins upset. He eventually married her. But he was fired. He was eventually fired from [06:17] his job at the U.S. Coastal Service after 31 years, and this was in the day before pensions, [06:22] before retirement plans.

So he was left penniless when he was roughly 60 years old, 62 years old. [06:31] He was left penniless and survived through the contributions of William James, who led a great [06:39] effort to round up people from Alexander Graham Bell to Andrew Carnegie to contribute monthly [06:46] to Peirce. But it was very pov… It was a poverty-level contribution, but it kept him from death, I mean, [06:53] and starvation.

Peirce, according to his diaries, was usually up at 7:30 in the morning and worked [06:59] till about midnight or 1 AM every day, seven days a week, and his neighbors said that the light [07:05] was always on in his study, and poverty did not keep him from working a tremendous amount. [07:11]

His papers originally were not well organized after his death. They were picked up and sold [07:17] for a very small price to Harvard, and Harvard took them and tried to organize them, but because [07:23] of his reputation for immorality, in part, Harvard wouldn’t allow access to those papers, [07:30] and so it was very hard to do work on Peirce. And one of the chairmen of the Harvard philosophy [07:36] department who had the control over the papers was Willard Van Orman Quine, who would not let [07:41] anyone see them. So it wasn’t until the work of Max Fisch and Paul Weiss and others that the [07:52] papers began to become organized and that we began to get access to them. Max Fisch worked for [07:59] 50 years on a Peirce biography that he never started, but he took over 70,000 notes on Peirce [08:08] and did a huge amount of historical research, and I have all of those on my computer now. [08:12] I made an effort to get to where they’re located in Indiana and copy them. So Peirce, in my opinion, [08:19] offers an exciting alternative to current views of linguistics, which, in my opinion, even if one [08:29] does not ultimately decide that they want to work within a Peircean linguistics, I think they will [08:36] find his ideas extremely interesting and relevant, even if they continue to work in the same model. [08:43]

JMc: So can I just ask you there, obviously he worked in pretty much every field of intellectual [08:49] endeavor, but you say he was the inventor of modern semiotics?

DE: Yes, Peirce was the inventor [08:56] of semiotics. He certainly wasn’t the first person to talk about the semeion and signs. [09:01] That goes back… You know, there’s great work on that by Sextus Empiricus, there’s work by [09:08] John Locke, and many others worked on signs, but Peirce was the first one to develop a formal [09:14] theory of semiotics. He actually saw logic as a branch of semiotics. And the big difference [09:20] between Peircean semiotics and other semiotics, such as Saussure’s, is that whereas Saussure’s, [09:27] for example, was dyadic — there was a form-meaning composite, which is what most linguists are used to; [09:36] you have a word “dog,” its form is d-o-g in English, and it means “canine,” “domesticated canine” — [09:44] but for Peirce, there were three components to any sign. There was the sign itself (the physical [09:51] form, which he called the representamen), there was the object of the sign (which was very crucial, [09:57] so “tree” has an object, this thing in nature), and there’s also the interpretant. Every sign [10:03] has to be interpreted by another sign. We can’t think without signs; we can’t talk without signs; [10:09] every sign needs another sign. So if I paraphrase what a tree is, I would still be using other [10:17] signs to interpret that sign. So in this sense, also for Peirce, semiotics is recursive. One sign [10:24] is interpreted by another sign, which is interpreted by another sign, so it’s signs all the way down. [10:29]

So that makes Peirce’s signs very different, and he developed a very elaborate system of signs. [10:35] The three most common signs for people who aren’t specialists in semiotics are the icon, [10:41] the index, and the symbol. And like many terms, those are very good terms. I mean, [10:48] people use them in various ways, not always the way Peirce used them, and there’s debate on how [10:55] Peirce used them, but there’s also a very strong consensus on how Peirce used these signs. [11:02] And, you know, an icon is something which has a correspondence that a speaker perceives [11:10] between the sign and the object. So a photograph is not just that it’s an image of [11:18] the object, but it corresponds. So in any photograph, no matter how vague, if I choose to see it as a [11:24] photograph of myself, I can point out the correspondences. A diagram is a correspondence; [11:30] a tree diagram in syntactic analysis is an icon. An index is something which is physically, [11:38] a sign which is physically connected to its object, such as smoke and fire and footprints, [11:43] and the person who made the footprints. And a symbol is something which is conventionally [11:49] determined, by and large. I’m simplifying in all of these, but it’s a simplified conventionality. [11:57] This has a lot of interest for linguistics and for neuroscience and for the evolution of language, [12:05] and I’ve talked about some of these, and I do plan to explore these in much more detail. [12:11] So the second book that I’m working on relevant to Peirce is Peircean Linguistics: A Chapter in the History of Pragmatist Thought, which you will see a similarity with [12:22] Cartesian Linguistics in the title. And in that volume, I plan to sort of, in part, [12:29] go through Cartesian linguistics and show the course how this would work, how this would be [12:33] in Peircean linguistics, and then outline some ideas. So Peirce, it’s difficult to think of [12:40] ways in which he couldn’t influence any part of linguistics, and I want to explore those. [12:46]

JMc: So your plan is basically to take Peircean semiotic theory and turn that into the basis [12:54] of linguistics? Is that the central idea of your Peircean linguistics? [12:57]

DE: No, not necessarily. Semiotics will be a major pillar of that, but more than anything else, [13:04] I mean, the semiotics is very important, but also Peircean inference is very important, because [13:10] one of the fundamental differences… I mean, when Russell and Whitehead wrote Principia Mathematica, they used Peirce’s logic, not Frege’s, but they mainly talked about Frege, [13:21] which was kind of funny, but they used Peirce’s logic, which had been slightly adapted by Peano. [13:28] Peirce introduced universal and existential quantifiers, but Peano just used slightly [13:33] different symbols for those, but that’s the system that Whitehead and Russell used, [13:38] and his inference is very important, whereas Frege introduced compositionality, you know, [13:44] the idea that the meaning of a sentence is the meaning of the parts and the way they were put [13:50] together, which has been by far one of the most influential ideas in modern linguistics. [13:57] Peirce did not propose that type of approach to meaning, and he developed an inferential [14:04] approach, which he formalized in his existential graphs. So, a large part of it will be to show [14:10] how existential graphs can handle not only sentences and propositions, but discourses, [14:17] and I think that counts as a serious advantage.

It also doesn’t require… This is one thing that [14:26] got me interested, in part. It doesn’t require syntactic recursion to get semantic recursion. [14:33] In other words, it’s not Montegovian. It doesn’t follow Richard Montague’s method [14:38] or Frege’s method, and I know that will be heresy to many, and certainly it doesn’t [14:45] imply any disrespect for those works that I think it’s worth exploring an alternative, [14:52] just to see that there is an alternative. I don’t think many linguists consider an alternative to [14:56] compositionality.

So, these are things I want to bring out in the theory, and the first thing I’ve [15:02] ever published sort of in an informal way about this is a chapter in the book Understanding Human Time, where I argue that in Pirahã, also in English, you can’t really understand temporal [15:16] interpretations if you don’t look at inference. And I mean inference across the elements of the [15:23] sentence, outside the sentence in the discourse, and in the context, the cultural-ecological [15:29] context. I give a lot of examples from English in that paper, and from Pirahã, and maybe other [15:36] languages in which I argue that inference is crucial.

JMc: Just on the question of semantics and [15:43] meaning, one of the things that you’ve written about Peirce is, and this is a quote: [15:48] “[F]rom a Peircean perspective, language is a tool […] to transfer information from one mind […] to another [15:54] through the facilitation of inference via an open-ended system of symbols. Language by this [16:00] view is a subtype of communication system. All communication is the transfer of information via [16:07] signs […]” But do you think that this account is faithful to Peirce’s conception of semiotics? [16:14] Because this idea of the transfer of information is a bit narrow, isn’t it? You know, this question [16:19] of exactly what the nature of meaning might be is one of the central questions of much of [16:23] semiotic scholarship. Meaning is often taken to be something much more than just definite [16:29] and determinate information that’s transferred from one mind to another. [16:32]

DE: Well, I absolutely agree with that, but I do think it’s compatible with Peirce. I think that we have [16:39] been influenced in many ways, extremely positively so, by the notion of information that is found [16:46] in computer science that comes out of Claude Shannon’s work. And in that view of information, [16:52] information is primarily based on the form of the message, and it doesn’t really get into meaning. [16:59] It looks at what does the form provide that we didn’t have before, but it doesn’t really get [17:04] into meaning. This is why I think John Searle’s Chinese room argument, which many people hate [17:11] but I like, is still valid, because what Searle tried to show in his Chinese room experiment is [17:17] that a computer using forms only is, in fact, exchanging information with the outside world [17:26] — there’s no question about that — but it’s not a meaning-based information. The interpretant [17:33] is missing. So, in a dyadic semiotics, such as a Saussurean semiotics, the computer is [17:40] performing just fine at a semiotic level. You stick in something from Chinese to the computer [17:47] and it spits out something in English, even though it doesn’t understand it.

But Searle had not read [17:53] much Peirce, and I was sharing an office with Searle, actually, at the time, right after he [17:59] came up with the Chinese room experiment in Brazil. We were in an office together for about [18:03] four months, and as we talked about it, he certainly never mentioned Peirce. He also said [18:08] that he was surprised there wasn’t an easy answer to that. He figured the computer scientists would [18:12] have an easy answer, but they don’t. But from a Peircean perspective, the interpretant is missing. [18:19] And so this is what makes Peircean information very different from Shannon information, and that is [18:26] that meaning really is part of information, and Peirce defines the growth of information as the [18:32] growth of symbols. Increasing the connotation and the denotation together is growth of symbols, [18:39] and so Peirce talks about meaning in a sophisticated way quite extensively. [18:45] So when I talk about information, I’m talking about information that is based on interpretant [18:52] meaning, how we deal with this, how we infer, and so it’s a much richer concept, perhaps not as [19:01] useful to some people as Shannon’s, but from a linguistic perspective, I see it as a much [19:05] richer concept than information in the Shannon model of information. [19:11]

JMc: Yeah, OK, fair enough. [19:13] I think what I was just getting at is that the use of the word “transfer” [19:18] implies to me that the speaker has a meaning that is sort of coded and sent to the recipient, [19:26] who then decodes it, but my understanding of Peirce with this notion of interpretant is that [19:31] it’s a much more open-ended process. The meaning that arises could be surprising even to the [19:37] speaker. [19:38]

DE: Exactly, and this is, when we talk about transfer of information, we don’t mean [19:44] that the final result is the same information for the hearer that it was for the speaker, [19:48] so it would be good to clarify that. It would be good for me to clarify that. [19:52] Because what I mean by transfer is Peircean transfer again, so that the interpretant of [19:56] the hearer may not be the intended interpretant of the speaker, so that the hearer could… the hearer’s interpretation [20:03] could be very surprising, as you just said, for the speaker. So, I agree with that. So, [20:09] transfer only makes sense in the way that I’ve just used it. [20:13]

JMc: You and John Searle sharing an office in Brazil sounds like a great premise for a sitcom. I’d watch that. [20:21]

DE: Yeah, I have great quotes from Searle in the office. You know, I was reading Rules and Representations by Chomsky, and I was a very strong Chomskyan at the time, and there’s a [20:33] passage where he strongly criticizes Searle, and so I turned to John, and I said, “Can I read this [20:38] to you?” And he said, “Sure.” So I read it to him, and I said, “What’s your reaction?” And he got a [20:43] big grin on his face, and he said, “Well, look, Noam and I have an agreement. I never understand [20:48] anything he writes, and he never understands anything I write.” [20:52]

JMc: To compare your Peircean linguistics to Chomsky’s Cartesian linguistics, I guess one point of contrast that immediately [21:01] jumps out is that you seem to be conceiving of language as fundamentally a system of communication, [21:07] but, of course, one of Chomsky’s controversial – and even counterintuitive – claims is that language did [21:15] not evolve for communication, but has been co-opted for this purpose. So, would you say [21:20] that that’s a difference between you and Chomsky? [21:23]

DE: Yes, definitely. And there are, of course, [21:26] several things to say about that. I think some of the biggest differences between Cartesian [21:31] linguistics — and Chomsky’s interpretation of it — and Peircean linguistics — my interpretation of it — [21:36] is nativism, rationalism, nominalism. Chomsky’s a nominalist-conceptualist, whereas Peirce was [21:45] strongly opposed to nominalism and realist in his own view of realism.

But for semiotics, [21:53] for a semiotic theory, the language of thought is semiotics. The language of communication is [22:00] semiotics. You can’t draw that kind of difference, saying that language evolved for thought and was [22:09] then exploited for communication. In fact, we see semiotics in other creatures. We’re not the [22:16] only creatures to communicate semiotically. Other creatures may use symbols, but we’re the only [22:21] ones to use them as an open-ended system of production. We can make any symbol we want as [22:27] soon as we decide we need it. Most animals can’t do that. We’re animals too, but we’re the one [22:31] animal that seems to be able to do that. So, for Peirce, it’s a non-issue to say… In my interpretation [22:38] of Peirce, it’s a non-issue to say that the language of thought was the purpose of language [22:43] and that it eventually evolved into a communication system. Chomsky talks about [22:50] errors that we make when we communicate that we don’t make when we think, [22:55] but there are many possible interpretations of that. I mean, I make errors when I walk [23:03] relative to the way I think about walking. I don’t include stubbing my toe on a [23:10] stool in the kitchen. I don’t think of that when I start walking, and so that’s an error. [23:16] That’s not the nature of walking. It’s just, I made an error, and we make errors in communication [23:21] and in thought. So, I don’t see that… From a semiotic perspective, that is a difference without [23:28] a difference. [23:30]

JMc: Thank you very much for answering those questions. [23:32]

DE: Yeah, thanks very much for asking them.