Insufficient Competition in Renewable Energy Auctions

In order to advance the “green revolution”, the EU has set some ambitious goals to drastically increase renewable energies in their energy portfolio. Part of that strategy is to award “support” (i.e. state subsidies) to renewable energy projects.

Today’s guest Marion Ott explains to us how these subsidies are allocated, which rules are discussed to improve this process and their (unintended) effects. In particular, we are discussing “endogenous rationing”, which tries to increase competition in the subsidies tenders by artificially reducing the supply.

Marion Ott is researcher at the  ZEW and member of the research department "Market Design". Her work is focussed on auction and market design.

You can find details on her current research activities on her homepage.

In particular, Marion recently published two papers on endogenous rationing, which you can find here (in English) and here (in German only).