Children can falsely attribute a the appearance of intentionality and robots to actual intentions, or actual kinds of mental states. And that probably leads them to ascribe more moral concern to these artificial beings than older kids who have more sticated appreciation of minds may have. Ah, i think as robots become more complex this kind of developmental pattern will likely change. The way that social structures are set up across cultures also serve as powerful cues of what ought to have moral rights or moral standing.
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I was raised in the tradition of believing that everyone is of equal moral worth. But when I scrutinise my daily practices, I don’t think I can honestly say that I act as if everyone is of equal moral worth. The idea that some people belong within the circle of moral concern and some do not is central to many moral systems. But what affects the dynamics of the moral circle? How does it contract and expand? Can it expand indefinitely? In this episode I discuss these questions with Joshua Rottman. Josh is an associate Professor in the Department of Psychology and the Program in Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind at Franklin and Marshall College. His research is situated at the intersection of cognitive development and moral psychology, and he primarily focuses on studying the factors that lead certain entities and objects to be attributed with (or stripped of) moral concern.
