And then by a transfer of necessity principle, everything god eternally knew is has that same necessity. So the argumenttha parallel argument, seems to go through. Now, you could say, well, a, my parallel argument is not as strong or as compelling as the argument about the necessity of the past, because don't have sayings like, there's no use crying over eternalha ha, ha ha. We don't say stuff like thato it said. And we do say there's no use crying over spilled milk. So we don't have, you know, in our collective imagination, this idea that we can't two plus two equals four, you know? I mean, we don't, you know, we just don't think about stuff like that. But so you might say that am the, a imaginative hold of the argument is weaker, this new argument than i just said a and, and, i mean, be right, but, but my point is that it does not really solve the problem. It doesn't solve the deeper problem that wherever god is, whether it's time or eternity, that seems to, i mean, whether it's the past, whether god's belifs or in the past or an eternity. Either way, it seems like we don't have any control over it. Anit has some form of necessity? Yes? It rules out your ability to do otherwise. Either way, yes. Either way a you just get basically to shift the argument from from a discussion of god's past knowledge to a discussion of god's eternal knowledge. And either way, it seems to be in a realm that we have no control. Thanks. That's very helpful. So you mention that there were three these historically significant responses that you wanted to talk about. The first was, this a boethian solution. What's the second solution?