I think people say of this Nagel essay that he introduced a problem that isn't really a problem. This heavy leaning on subjective experience isn't the problem he makes it out to be. But I've not read any satisfactory answer as to why it's not a problem. They usually fall back on some sort of physicalism or materialism, which is just as unsatisfying. It's just specifying that we're eliminating the hard part.
We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?
Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.
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