Well, that's what central bankers are worried about across the board. The US historically hasn't had to worry about that. But certainly at the rest of the world has. Yeah. I

haven't even got into, we haven't even gotten into, we haven't even gotten into Japan and their role in this. And what happens when they end yield curve control and all the, what's just happening? But it is happening.

Yes.

And it's pretty wild, isn't it? And it's a good thing. And it's right on schedule. Right as I expected it to happen, as a matter of fact, it's scary enough. Well,

okay, give the elevator speech version of that.

Oh, sure. I have it on

schedule.

Yeah. So it's really, it's really simple. Last fall, the Euro bottoms at 95.6 cents. We get the snap, we start to get a snapback rally. And then Corota widens the target as his last act before he leaves. And here's the interesting one. Yeah. So the again is the ultimate carry currency. The yen is now sitting at nearly 150. And the yen and the yield curve control has been helping Europe run a carry trade in order to support the euro for years. Right. So, but if they start raising interest rates, if they start allowing the long end of the curve in Europe and Japan the run hot, hot, and credit spreads between JGBs and Buns start to start to collapse, then those trades have to run wide. Yes. Right. Okay. So Corota's last act as as BOG, BOG chairman is sort of widened. One of the band bang. And then his, his lieutenant, Kishita in Japan, this is a seniority based society steps aside and says, for the good of Japan, I am not going to take over because I was the healthy architect of yield curve control in QE. And we need to be mainly fresh blood. The way that takes over and the first thing he basically says is, Oh yeah, we're going to get rid of yield curve control. Just check it out the window. Yeah, it's going, but we're going to do it by degrees. And he's now allowed. And he's for years, I always like him that this way. It's a between the BOG, the Fed and and Lagarde at the ECB. It's like a, it's like a big game of Texas hold them. The Fed, okay, Fed for years underplayed their aces in the hole, like and folded at, you know, the first sign that somebody bets over bets them. And like, even though they fought their set or whatever, if you're no Texas hold them as well, the Fed's holding the nuts. And then they get raised a little bit and they fold. And that's why I bore blowing

out, right? In

2008, the BOG, the ECB gets dealt cards off the bottom of the deck in order to win hands that they shouldn't win. And the BOG is what their whole carts face up.

Dueta just

turned their whole carts face down by saying, got it. Hey, we're not going to tell you exactly what we're going to do anymore.

I understand that. Yeah.

No, looking at it from that perspective, who's the loser at this table? If now, if Powell now plays his aces properly and plays position properly and actually plays like a, like a, like even a semi professional freaking poker player who should win a pot every once in a while. Like for Christ sake, under yelling in Bernanke, they literally played the, they were the fish at the table. And everybody knew it. That's the way I get on. That's my, that's my

elevator. And thus the US got kicked around.

And now we got zero-bound interest rates. We got every time the Fed tried to tighten, we got the they had the pivot beforehand, blah, blah, blah, blah, because the Euro dollar, because Jeff Snyder was correct for years that the offshore dollar markets were

the tail wagging it on a monetary policy. That

is no longer the case. And he and I fundamentally disagree on that. So, well,

I mean, I guess the question is, do we have the data to determine that? Right. I mean, LIBOR went to Sopher, which is a huge change. Right. So we've got control now. It's not the London banks that have the control over interest rates. And for those who are, who haven't followed you on this, you were the ones who, who one who made me realize the importance of that, I knew it was happening, but I didn't fully understand. I thought they were just trying to get bank credit out of interest rates. No, they're actually bringing the control of US dollar offshore interest rates out of London and bringing it back on shore into the US. So yes, it's now a, it's now a, not a bank credit determination, right? Back in 2008 when LIBOR spreads blew out and I was working on the trading floor working with Stanley, you know, we had bank balance sheet problems influencing the whole US economy. And it was back then there was, I think, only one or maybe two US banks in the LIBOR panel, right? It was, it was non US banks credit problems that were blowing back on shore into the US, which is why the Fed knew that it had to get control of LIBOR and it took them, what, 15 years almost to it, but

they did. Well, so far was on the drawing board back during the Obama administration and Geithner said, and, and, and Bernanke and Allen said no to it for years. Well, because you're saying that the Davos crowd didn't want it because they wanted to keep control over that in London. Yeah.

And that's a reasonable argument. Yeah. It makes

sense. It makes sense. Like, and so today we're, we're staring at a different situation. I think we do have the, the data on this because everybody wanted the Fed to pivot at 1%. And then, look, we're at five and a half percent and nothing's quote unquote broken yet. Yeah, things are breaking, but we're at five. Yeah. And we've been at five and we've been over five percent for 20, all 2023.

Yeah.