Is It Possible That Mind Attribution Predicts Moral Worth in Robots?
Jush: Is there any question that i should have asked, that you wish i had asked before we wrap up? A it could be that people like me, who comment on things like moral trade offs being inherent in decisions that we make, maybe that's a negative thing to do. Ah, so, so it does seem like these kinds of mind attribution tendencies and their effects on moral concern are fairly domain general. Jush: I think we will leave it at that. And thanks for rejoining me for this conversation.
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I was raised in the tradition of believing that everyone is of equal moral worth. But when I scrutinise my daily practices, I don’t think I can honestly say that I act as if everyone is of equal moral worth. The idea that some people belong within the circle of moral concern and some do not is central to many moral systems. But what affects the dynamics of the moral circle? How does it contract and expand? Can it expand indefinitely? In this episode I discuss these questions with Joshua Rottman. Josh is an associate Professor in the Department of Psychology and the Program in Scientific and Philosophical Studies of Mind at Franklin and Marshall College. His research is situated at the intersection of cognitive development and moral psychology, and he primarily focuses on studying the factors that lead certain entities and objects to be attributed with (or stripped of) moral concern.
