Sadly, Colin Powell is best remembered in many quarters for deploying his immense personal prestige in giving what became his infamous speech at the United Nations. This speech purported to reveal evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, thereby building support for the disastrous U.S. invasion of that country. Powell did not want to give this speech on the rushed timetable demanded by President George W. Bush along with neoconservatives Vice President Dick Cheney and others. Having “lost” this timing negotiation with the president, the die was cast. We probe this episode for insight into how a more sophisticated approach to his “negotiation” with the president might have led to a very different outcome, in the process seeking to extract positive lessons from painful negotiating failures.
About Dealcraft
Host: Jim Sebenius
Co-Producers: Alex Green & Avery Moore Kloss
Outreach: Podglomerate
Materials courtesy of the American Secretaries of State Program, a joint effort of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, the Program on the Future of Diplomacy at Harvard Kennedy School, and Harvard Business School. Copyright © President and Fellows of Harvard College.
