Nagel is doing it in a way that doesn't rely on asking us to try to imagine something that we really can't imagine or conceive of. And the only cost for that is being a little more modest about the claims, not going, not making a positive claim, as you said, about physicalism being true or false, or dualism or anything like that.
We try (with varying success) to wrap our heads around Thomas Nagel’s classic article “What is it Like to be a Bat?" Does science have the tools to give us a theory of consciousness or is that project doomed from the outset? Why do reductionist or functionalist explanations seem so unsatisfying? Is the problem that consciousness is subjective, or is it something about the nature of conscious experience itself? Is this ultimately an epistemological or metaphysical question? What are we talking about? Do we even know anymore?
Plus, the return of Mr. Robot! We talk about the big new mystery at the heart of the new season.
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