Transcript

The following transcript is AI-generated and may differ from the original in slight ways.

Welcome to the Sentinel podcast, where top forecasters discuss the potential for global catastrophic risks. I'm your host, Rai, and I'm joined today by my co-founder and Sentinel forecaster, Nuno Sempere, Sentinel forecaster Vidur Kapur...

Vidur 00:00:44

Hello.

Rai 00:00:45

And Sentinel forecaster Lisa.

Lisa 00:00:47

Hello.

Rai 00:00:48

Today we're going to be talking about the possibility of regime change in Iran. Before we go into that, does anyone want to describe why we care about this possibility? Why does it matter for global catastrophic risks?

Vidur 00:01:00

From my perspective, regime change would reduce the probability of a nuclear detonation in the Middle East over the next decade.

While it's possible it could lead to a more extreme, less rational regime, my base case is that it would reduce the risk of a nuclear exchange. That's why it has a bearing on global catastrophic risk.

Nuño 00:01:27

In addition, Iran is a country of 90 to 92 million people, so regime change there affects a large population.

Even if it doesn't lead to a nuclear weapon, we've seen that regime change can destabilize a region. With the change in Afghanistan, for example, terrorist groups in Pakistan could operate more freely.

If the Iranian regime falls without a clear successor, the whole region could be destabilized in a way that leads to bad outcomes.

Vidur 00:02:03

It can also destabilize other regions. The regime changes in Libya and Iraq, for instance, destabilized European politics. So the effects can be felt both within the region and elsewhere.

Lisa 00:02:18

I'd like to add the flip side. Imagine an Iran that doesn't fund proxies throughout the region.

While there would be immediate instability for a few years after regime change, as you've all mentioned, it's also possible that in the longer term, it could increase regional stability. This would mean a potential for less conflict, independent of the risk of nuclear detonations.

Rai 00:03:05

Let's get to the forecasts. We're forecasting the probability of regime change on two timelines: by the end of August and by the end of the year.

Let's go around and get your two probabilities, and then we'll discuss them. Let's start with Nuno.

Nuño 00:03:32

For the end of the year, I'm in the 10% to 40% range, so I'll put it at 25%. I'm confused because Vidhur and Lisa, who are great forecasters, are at different extremes. To resolve that, I went back to basics and looked at the base rate of regime change.

Regime change happens relatively frequently in countries around Iran. In the last 25 years, Afghanistan has switched hands, Syria's regime fell, you could argue Lebanon had a partial regime change, and Iraq was invaded. Based on that, I get a base rate of 2% to 4% per year, which is a good starting point.

Of course, recent events increase that probability. But by how much? A 10x increase, from 1-in-50 to 1-in-2, seems like too much. That's how I'm thinking about it.

Rai 00:05:15

And do you have a forecast for the end of August?

Nuño 00:05:17

By the end of August is trickier. I'll go with 7%. I'm very uncertain about the timing of a potential collapse.

More time allows instability to compound, but I also sense that the critical moment is now, rather than later in the year.

Rai 00:05:43

What about you, Vidhur?

Vidur 00:05:45

By the end of August, I'm at 10%, and by the end of the year, I'm at 15%.

Rai 00:05:53

And Lisa?

Lisa 00:05:56

I'm struggling a bit because so much is happening so quickly. It's difficult to figure out what's going on, especially since the stance on regime change from Israel and the US seems to shift daily.

However, my forecasts are substantially higher than my colleagues'. For August, I would say about 50% to 60%. By the end of the year, 60% to 70%.

I see much of that risk as front-loaded. The greatest period of instability is now, in the coming weeks and months, as the regime struggles to adapt after Israel has killed a large number of its leaders in airstrikes and drone attacks.

The regime is very repressive, and it takes a lot of effort to maintain control. They seem to be trying to cope by increasing arrests. Another key aspect is Khamenei. It's not clear where he is, and he might be quite ill. I'm not sure he will be living very long, but we can talk more in a few minutes.

Rai 00:07:45

You should interrogate each other about why you see the probability so differently, especially on such a short timeframe.

Lisa 00:07:56

I'd like to say more about why I think the probability is so high. A big factor is that Khamenei isn't very present. I keep seeing reports—and I don't know if they're true—that the IRGC and other leaders are withholding information from him and that he's not fully involved in governing.

For instance, after the recent ceasefire, he never came out to address the country and claim a glorious victory for Iran. It's just been crickets, which is weird.

Nuño 00:08:41

How old is he right now?

Lisa 00:08:42

86.

Nuño 00:08:43

So that's what, a 5% chance of dying per year? Something in that ballpark.

Lisa 00:08:48

I think there's something bigger going on here. Israel and the US do not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons and have gone to great lengths to damage its nuclear program. And yet, regime leaders are doubling down, resuming enrichment, and denying IAEA inspectors access. There was even talk about leaving the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

At the same time, Israel has stopped its strikes, and the US goal seemed to be simply dealing with buried nuclear facilities. It's hard for me to understand why they would go to all this trouble to set things back by only a few months or years if the regime is just going to keep pressing forward.

One answer I can come up with is that they believe regime change is likely. Perhaps they have intelligence that Khamenei is on his deathbed. That's what I'm wondering. Of course, there are many factors, and nobody wants chaos.

Rai 00:10:22

When you say setting things back by months to years, you're talking about the nuclear program and enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels, correct?

Lisa 00:10:31

Yes, and generally, everything that goes into building a nuclear weapon.

Rai 00:10:37

If the short setback—only a few months to a few years—makes you think this is about regime change, why doesn't it push you toward the conclusion that the strikes were simply ineffective?

Why wouldn't that ineffectiveness, intentional or not, be the primary explanation for the short setback, rather than the focus being on regime change?

Lisa 00:11:10

That's a great question. It's quite possible the strikes were the best they could do and that all they can hope for is to set things back by a few months or years. We could just be doing this on rinse and repeat.

However, that strategy would become less effective over time. The more Iran anticipates such strikes, the more they would prepare by building deeper facilities and hiding them better. There's already talk of facilities that weren't hit. Iran could do many things in this cat-and-mouse game to make successive strikes less effective.

That's why I would have thought they'd be more likely to push for regime change, or at least a change within the regime. Trump said regime change was on the table, and I believe the Israeli Defense Minister said that Khamenei could no longer exist. It looked like they were going for that.

But it's also quite possible this was simply an attempt to address an immediate threat, and now that it's addressed, they're done.

Still, we have to look at the regime itself. You can't go through these leadership changes without creating internal chaos. Their stability is weakened. The question then becomes what opposition groups, inside and outside Iran, do to take advantage of this situation and what help they might be getting from countries like Israel or the US. None of us really knows.

Nuño 00:13:10

I would love to hear from Vidor on the opposing case.

Vidur 00:13:13

To explain my reasoning, I also started with a base rate. Nunu's rate of 4% to 5% per year isn't far from my own. You can look at two categories of regime change: externally forced and internal.

Since World War II, the base rate for an externally forced regime change in Iran is around 1% to 2%. This happened with the 1953 coup sponsored by the US and UK. The base rate for an internal change is also around 1% to 2%, as seen in the 1979 revolution. I'd give an external regime change a 2% chance in the next six months and an internal change a 12% to 13% chance.

I'm low on an external regime change now because the US hasn't truly committed. You could interpret Trump's Truth Social post as saying the Iranian people might change their own regime to "make Iran great again," similar to how he views his own election. He later said he's not in favor of it. While the Israeli Defense Minister was aggressive, Netanyahu said the Iranian people might have to rise up themselves, implying Israel won't do it all for them. Neither Trump nor Netanyahu seemed fully committed.

Yes, the strikes have destabilized the regime by killing top people, which could lead to an internal regime change. However, these senior people can be replaced. In a country of 90 million, there will be plenty of people willing to take those jobs, despite the elevated risk of death.

We also haven't seen the kind of mass protests that would suggest a movement against the regime. We saw protests in 2009-2011, but nothing happened. The only recent protests I'm aware of were student protests against the US and Israeli attacks, which the Prime Minister joined.

As Lisa pointed out, it's possible that the Ayatollah dies in the next six months. He is 86 years old, and an American male of that age has about a 5% to 6% chance of dying in that timeframe. You can argue he has better healthcare, but he has also had past health problems.

His death could destabilize the regime, but it's also possible that, just as after Khomeini died, they will simply elect a new ayatollah and things will run fairly smoothly.

Nuño 00:16:36

It's interesting that Vidor, Lisa, and I have different interpretive frameworks. One framework suggests we're seeing the regime fall in real time. We have reasons to think this is the case: the reduction in the number of mosques, not knowing where Khamenei is, and many top commanders being killed.

On the other hand, you have the "nothing ever happens" school of thought. If you ask about August, which is just over two months away, it just takes longer for things to happen. A base rate of 5% per year doesn't give you that high of a probability in such a short timeframe.

I think Lisa would agree on the base rate but would argue that we now have extremely strong evidence that moves the probability from a few percentage points all the way to 50%. Vidor and other forecasters might disagree. I'm confused and oscillating somewhere in the middle.

Lisa 00:17:45

It's a very confusing time. But one thing I'll note is that both of your forecasts are elevated above the baseline. We all fundamentally agree that things are different now; the only question is how much.

So what has changed? What elevates the risk of regime change above the baseline rate? To me, the highlights are the decapitations of the leadership, specifically targeting the repressive machinery. IRGC commanders and the headquarters for the repressive apparatus within Tehran and around the country have been hit. This is a massive setback for them.

Sure, they still have between 125,000 and 190,000 IRGC members and other personnel who know what to do without being told. But how is that organization going to recover? It's possible it fully recovers and they're able to keep a lid on everything.

But we are at the tail end of this regime. It's been 46 years. People just aren't interested in going to mosques anymore; two-thirds of the mosques have closed. People really don't want to hear it anymore.

They don't want to be told they can't sing and dance in the streets. Women want to walk around without a hijab. Not all of them, of course—nothing is monolithic—but people in general want more freedom than they're getting in this regime.

In addition, by becoming a pariah state, the country gave up so much economic growth. Because of years and years of sanctions, their economy is really suffering. Add to that massive amounts of corruption within the highest levels of leadership. People are very disillusioned. On the one hand, this is supposed to be a regime that holds itself to the highest standards, yet here's this ordinary corruption going on.

They've also structured their economy and power generation in ways that cripple both the economy and reliable power, especially in winter. There are very large structural problems.

Nuño 00:20:41

Can you say more about the power generation?

Lisa 00:20:44

Most of their electricity generation relies on natural gas. They prioritize providing it to households for heating, which makes sense. But in the winter, this creates shortages. If there's enough gas for heating homes, there isn't enough for electricity in major cities.

There can be hours, even days, without power, even in major cities. Businesses shut down, schools shut down, and everyone has to stay home from work because their kids are home. It's massively disruptive, and it's getting worse.

This is compounded by the regime's price controls on gasoline and the state's control over the energy sector. The IRGC controls a large percentage of the nation's economy. These are really large problems, and they're getting worse every year.

There's massive inflation, very close to 40%. People are tired of this. This is not like the Islamic Revolution happened five or ten years ago. This is the tail end of a repressive regime, and people are tired.

Rai 00:22:17

I want to make a few things from your model explicit and get your sign-off. Do you see most scenarios as the regime toppling under its own weight or changing internally?

Lisa 00:22:33

In the absence of an external stimulus, my best guess would have been that the regime would last another one to five years.

Rai 00:22:42

Got it. You can't cleanly separate these factors. Israel will be involved and might accelerate things, but the question is whether they are the driving force. Are they going to be proactive, continually removing people until something happens, or will they be more reactive?

So you see them as being more reactive, with a number of structural factors causing the first dominoes to fall.

Lisa 00:23:09

Yes, but the trouble with an authoritarian regime is that it doesn't allow opposition to grow. So, as we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan, if you remove the group in power, there isn't necessarily another one organically ready to take its place. This will be very difficult for Iran and is the crux of what comes next.

As Vidor said, we'll have to see. There will be lots of people willing to step in and take over in some form.

One of the key questions is whether the inevitable regime change will come fully from the outside, or if it will be someone within the current government who decides to do something different. They might say, "I'm in charge now. We'll keep these aspects of the regime but get rid of those." There are a lot of options for how this could play out.

Nuño 00:24:20

One interesting factor is this: you have people willing to step up and die for the continuation of the regime. But do you have people willing to die and put their lives on the line for a revolution?

The answer could be no. Religion may inspire a much greater willingness to die for the regime, which makes it more resilient. That doesn't seem unreasonable to me.

Lisa 00:24:48

The question is, are you willing to throw away your life to fight the regime, or are you willing to die if there's an achievable goal?

People wouldn't want to stand up by themselves and fight, but if they thought there was a reasonable chance of success, many would be willing to stand up. It's a question of what the realistic chances of success are.

It could also be that people are more willing to stand up for religion than for secular regime change.

Nuño 00:25:25

I'm on board with much of your analysis, but I don't get the timing. Why now? Your analysis seems equally valid if the regime falls three years from now.

Lisa 00:25:37

The timing is crucial for two reasons. First, they're in massive chaos because of what Israel just did.

Second, it looks like Khamenei may be about to die. It's not clear that the full succession apparatus is intact or that it would even be followed. We could see some sort of coup right there.

Nuño 00:26:04

The Khamenei situation is relatively new, isn't it? From the last couple of days?

Lisa 00:26:09

We're seeing more speculation about it, but there have been rumors for at least several months. I saw some last year.

I don't know the nature of his difficulty right now, but it's possible he was injured in an airstrike by Israel. We don't know. Israel might know, but I don't.

Rai 00:26:33

Vidor, do you have a sense of where your crux is with Lisa? What do you think she's weighting too heavily?

Vidur 00:26:41

Lisa is talking about all the problems Iranians are facing, but I think she's weighting them too heavily. Pointing to problems alone doesn't necessarily mean the regime is going to fall.

There are also a lot of social media rumors about Khamenei and his whereabouts, and I'm not sure how much we can trust them.

Lisa 00:27:13

We function better as a group. For those unfamiliar with forecasting, we improve when we challenge and listen to each other, learn new information, and consider different perspectives. This is part of what makes good forecasting.

I may not be right, Vidor may not be right, Nuno may not be right, but together, our averages are usually better than individual forecasts. None of us is infallible, and our forecasts are made better by listening to each other.

For our listeners, please understand that these disagreements are part of what forecasting is about. Nuno, what are your thoughts?

Nuño 00:28:09

You have a point that Khamenei not making statements is a signal. At the same time, I recall previous speculation about this a few years ago. Maybe he just doesn't feel the need to be out there all the time, as he's an older man who isn't as energetic.

Lisa 00:28:32

But he's not even making statements. There's nothing.

Vidur 00:28:38

He has made statements, or at least statements have been put out in his name over the past day or two. His last public appearance, however, was perhaps six or seven days ago.

Lisa 00:28:52

The last tweet from his account was: "Those who know the Iranian people and their history know that the Iranian nation isn't a nation that surrenders."

Nuño 00:29:02

He's tweeting roughly every two days.

Lisa 00:29:03

You know, roughly.

Nuño 00:29:05

Here's a tweet from Khamenei from June 18: "The Zionist regime's malicious attack on our country took place at a time when Iranian officials were indirectly engaged in negotiations with the U.S. side. There was no indication on the part of Iran that signaled a military move."

It doesn't seem very fiery.

Lisa 00:29:27

Besides, how many of these are actually written by him? We don't know if he wrote them or even spoke them to be written down by someone else.

Vidur 00:29:36

Even if he dies, he has reportedly picked his successors. There's a strong possibility the regime will continue. They'll elect a new ayatollah, and everything will be fine for them.

Nuño 00:29:55

There was a taboo about his direct descendants inheriting the mantle of the Ayatollah. There was also speculation about Khamenei solving this by appointing a very old successor.

Lisa 00:30:11

It's not done to appoint your son as a successor. You can overcome that by appointing an interim successor who is not likely to live long.

There's one possibility who I believe is 96 years old. He would clearly have a limited term, after which Mojtaba, his son, could be chosen.

Nuño 00:30:40

That would just carry on the instability. Having a 96-year-old as a wartime leader doesn't seem like a great idea.

Lisa 00:30:52

You also have to ask to what extent that person would actually be leading the country.

Rai 00:30:57

Lisa, how are you thinking about the weakness of the IRGC? There are two ways to look at it. One is that if the recent damage was going to crack their enforcement, it would have happened already. Since it didn't, that's evidence the regime will last longer.

The other way is to see it as a gradual decay. Without their coordination infrastructure, they'll get progressively worse, opening the door for civil unrest and protests. It sounds like you believe in the latter model.

Why isn't the lack of immediate collapse evidence that the repressive enforcement is stickier than you think and won't collapse so quickly?

Lisa 00:31:51

I don't see this as the only thing going on. The state apparatus has been destabilized. That alone might not be enough to topple the regime, but coupled with the potential loss of Khamenei, the combination leads to major destabilization.

Reports I'm seeing from Iran suggest increasing crackdowns on the citizenry. This is done from a position of weakness, a recognition that the regime is fragile. You don't crack down on your people if you feel secure.

People are fearing thousands of arrests and even executions in the coming months.

Rai 00:32:49

The crackdown could be done out of fear, but its purpose is also to increase the threshold for collective action. In that, it could be successful.

Lisa 00:32:59

It could be successful, but it suggests to me that the regime feels threatened. We'll see which way it goes in the coming weeks and months.

It's possible that one or more leaders could rise up within Iran, and people could be emboldened to make a change.

Alternatively, there could be a massive crackdown. The price of action would be increased to where it's too expensive, and everything would go back to the way it was. Same chairs, different people. That's possible.

Nuño 00:33:39

If opposition leaders rise up, methodically killing them is a viable method. Putin assassinated Navalny, who was the last in a long line of potential opposition leaders.

Lisa 00:33:56

And when that was done, there wasn't a massive attack on Putin's regime.

Any way we slice it, this is a period of instability for the regime. The only question is how much. You don't think it's very much, but I think it's a lot.

Nuño 00:34:11

No, I think it's a lot of instability. But when thinking about when it happens, I'm more certain than you are about the next couple of years. I agree that there are cracks in the regime.

Another source of uncertainty is the current US-Israel ceasefire. How long will that last? Will Trump change his mind in the next couple of months?

Maybe Iran will try to race for a nuke, which would lead to more Israeli attacks and further destabilization. That's another source of uncertainty.

Lisa 00:34:44

Definitely. I completely agree with that. There's a lot of unpredictability.

Vidur 00:34:48

I strongly agree. The key uncertainty is how long this ceasefire will last. Who has Trump's ear? Is it the more hawkish neoconservatives, who see this as their chance—after waiting for decades—to get rid of the Iranian regime?

Or is it people like JD Vance, who are urging caution and don't want the US to attempt another regime change?

Rai 00:35:16

Let's do another round of forecasts after this discussion and see if anyone has moved. We'll go in the same order, starting with Nuno. What are your forecasts for regime change in Iran by the end of August and the end of the year?

Nuño 00:35:30

I'll go up a little bit, but I still think August is very soon. Let's say 5% for August and 20% for the end of the year.

Rai 00:35:42

Sounds good. Vidur?

Vidur 00:35:43

I'll go from about 1 in 10 by August to 1 in 9, which is a move from 10% to about 11%. For the end of the year, I was between 1 in 6 and 1 in 7, and I'll now go to 1 in 6. Lisa?

Lisa 00:36:00

It's a period of such huge volatility. Everything changes every single day.

Nuño 00:36:07

And that volatility should move you towards 50%, right?

Lisa 00:36:09

Towards 50%.

Rai 00:36:10

Nuno, can you say more about that? Theoretically, why should that volatility move her more towards 50%?

Nuño 00:36:16

If you have a spectrum with regime collapse on one end and the regime continuing on the other, and you're oscillating between factors that pull you significantly toward either side, then any strong reasons you have could be negated by a future factor. You're seeing a lot of wild jumps.

Lisa 00:36:38

They are very wild jumps, and it's hard to deal with that level of uncertainty. Okay, I'll walk down my forecast. For August, 50%… I can't remember my initial number.

Rai 00:36:54

I think that was your initial forecast.

Nuño 00:36:56

Yes, 50%. And you were at 70%—or 65%—by the end of the year.

Lisa 00:37:00

It was 70%. So, 50% and 70%.

Okay, I'll walk my forecast down a bit. For August, I'll go to 45%, and by the end of the year, 65%. It still seems very likely to me, but maybe I'm completely wrong. We will find out. That's one thing about forecasting: there will be an answer.

Rai 00:37:24

When you update your forecasts, how much of it is based on a specific new piece of information that changed your mind?

And how much of it is simply trusting another person's judgment and moving toward the group average out of caution, even if you don't fully understand their reasoning?

Lisa 00:37:46

I would say it's both. In general, if you have a group of good forecasters and one person's forecast is very different from the others—which is my situation right now—that's a red flag. You should think very carefully about a divergent forecast, because chances are you're missing something.

That said, if you have strong justifications and a firm belief, it's reasonable to maintain a divergent forecast.

I listen to the specific considerations my fellow forecasters raise, and I very much trust their judgment. That gives weight to what they have to say. One could argue that I should weight their opinions even more highly and lower my forecast further.

But it's a dynamic process. Forecasts aren't static; they evolve over time. And that's what good forecasting is.

Rai 00:38:53

If you converge too much, you're just a pack of conformists. You have to be willing to deviate to some degree.

I also want to get your thoughts on the extent of the damage done to Iran's nuclear weapons program. There seems to be wide uncertainty about it. Countries like Israel and the US are claiming victory, while others are doubtful significant damage was done.

What evidence do you find convincing? And ultimately, how long do you think Iran would need to rebuild and get back to enriching uranium to weapons-grade levels? Let's start with Nuno.

Nuño 00:39:39

One specific piece of evidence I've been wondering about is the satellite imagery of Fordo and other facilities being hit with massive bunker-buster bombs. You can see the size of the holes. A bomb that's one meter wide and several meters high creates a hole about five meters wide, with a volcanic-like mound around it that's about 10 meters.

What I'm curious about is the depth of the hole. If this bomb is made to burrow into a nuclear bunker, did it actually reach the 90-meter depth where the bunker is located? It's a simple physics question. It's a whole mountain with a small hole. Maybe they hit the wrong place. I just want to know how deep the bomb went, and we don't have great answers.

My sense is the Americans know. They can use satellites to observe the difference in light and shadow to calculate the depth of the hole. The Iranians probably know, but I don't. I only know what's being publicly reported. The Iranians are saying it's a surface wound. The Americans are saying it's completely destroyed. I'm uncertain.

On top of that, there's meta-level uncertainty. We have satellite images for this one location, but there are other locations. It seems nuclear material was taken out. There are many unknown factors. This is what I've been thinking about. Hopefully, Vidur or Lisa can fill in the blanks.

Vidur 00:41:35

Many people are saying different things. Trump claims the program has been completely destroyed, Israel says there's a lot of damage, and even Iran has said its facilities were badly damaged. All three of these groups have an incentive to emphasize the damage. Netanyahu wants Trump to think his involvement was worthwhile, Trump wants to justify his attack, and Iran doesn't want to be attacked again.

However, a leaked intelligence report suggests the damage wasn't so severe and might have only set Iran back by a matter of months. I think that report is probably directionally correct.

But if you look at the satellite imagery of the above-ground facilities, there has clearly been extensive damage. Some of these facilities were quite important—unless we believe they were just decoys and Iran has other facilities to move their uranium to.

For instance, at Isfahan, there was damage to metal conversion plants and other facilities crucial for the final stages of building a nuclear weapon. At the Arak facility that Israel bombed, the heavy water reactor, which was under construction and could be used for producing plutonium, was destroyed. So, Iran has definitely suffered a setback.

As Nuno mentioned, it's harder to assess the facilities buried deep underground because we lack public information. What Iran and the US seem to acknowledge is that Iran still has highly enriched uranium. This is significant because if they have other facilities and a few hundred kilograms of HEU, they can probably build a nuclear weapon.

Even a crude, Hiroshima-style nuclear weapon can be built fairly quickly. You don't need much HEU for a gun-assembly weapon; the Hiroshima bomb used about 64 kilograms. These bombs aren't very efficient—only about one kilogram of uranium in the Hiroshima bomb actually underwent fission—but you can still make a very simple nuclear weapon.

There are still stages required to assemble the weapon properly, but as long as they have this HEU and can perhaps enrich it a bit more, they can make something of it.

My key uncertainty is this: if they have this stock of highly enriched uranium, do they have other facilities—perhaps not for a sophisticated program, but enough to make a crude nuclear weapon?

Lisa 00:45:15

The question is, how far back has their nuclear program been set? It's clear the setback is somewhere between months and years, but we can't know for sure at this point. There hasn't been enough time to make assessments.

It would be great if IAEA inspectors could be on the ground, but that may never happen. Still, everyone would agree there has been a substantial setback; the question is how much.

As Madur says, it might not take them long to assemble a crude nuclear weapon. These risks are still out there.

The can has been kicked down the road, but the problem has not been eliminated. It's something we will still have to deal with.

Rai 00:46:14

Is it possible that these attacks have made it more likely for Iran to pursue a weapon? Do the statements from the US and Israel, playing up their success, create a problem?

Or will those past statements be forgotten as Iran gets closer to a nuclear weapon, at which point the motivation for further action will return, regardless of what was said before?

Lisa 00:46:38

Being attacked certainly gives Iran more motivation and incentive to develop a nuclear weapon. I don't know what the game plan is from here.

Would the US and Israel simply conduct more strikes in the future? They seem committed to preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, so that would be the implication.

Perhaps they have other ideas beyond airstrikes. We saw the Stuxnet cyberattack disable centrifuges before. I'm not sure where this is going if the regime does not change.

Rai 00:47:25

Stuxnet did more than just disable the centrifuges, which would have been obvious. It modulated the speed of the rotation slightly and even altered the telemetry, so it didn't look like anything was wrong.

Lisa 00:47:41

But in the end, they were non-functional.

Vidur 00:47:44

To your question, Iran has moved to suspend cooperation with the IAEA, so they seem to be becoming more insular and less transparent. I agree with Lisa that this probably increases their desire for a nuclear weapon.

The question is, absent intervention, how long would that take? We can look at China's nuclear program in the 1960s. It took them a few months to get from enriching enough uranium to assembling a weapon for testing. It's quite possible Iran could do it in a few months if they wanted to.

Nuño 00:48:31

Meanwhile, Israel would notice and attack again.

Vidur 00:48:35

If Israel wants to keep attacking, then unless Iran has some extremely secure facilities, Israel and the United States can keep setting them back. That is why our forecast for the probability of a nuclear detonation fell after these US attacks. The US and Israel could keep on top of it if they wanted to.

It's also worth noting that the dozen or more nuclear scientists who have been assassinated represent a significant setback for Iran. There aren't many people with that know-how.

Iran has said it has the indigenous knowledge to continue, but there are few people in the world who truly understand these things. Even if the procedures are written down, my knowledge of bioweapons development tells me there is a lot of contextual knowledge needed to implement them in a real-world setting. That's an important consideration.

Rai 00:49:49

The takeaway for listeners is that even though the strikes were not decisive, we are probably in a pattern where Iran's nuclear program can be continually set back. The net effect is either a lowering of nuclear risk or at least not a massive increase from the background level.

Nuño 00:50:13

You could also have the opposite case. As the regime becomes more unstable, it could make acquiring a nuclear weapon an existential priority, deciding it can only survive if it rushes to build one.

The previous stable equilibrium was that they had the ability to rush but chose not to. So you could imagine a probability increase that way.

Rai 00:50:36

My understanding was that Vido incorporated that desire. Iran could have a ton of desire to pursue a weapon, especially now. With fewer diplomatic off-ramps and no cooperation with the IAEA, they've become polarized—either ditch the program or go for broke.

But the limiting factor is whether that increased desire actually translates to an ability to defend the program from Israel or the U.S. How can you defend it?

Vidur 00:51:08

That's my view, all things considered. However, I do think it's possible that Iran races to a nuclear weapon.

We sometimes assume U.S. and Israeli intelligence is omniscient and infallible, but perhaps they've missed something. If so, Iran might have the ability to weaponize quite quickly.

Rai 00:51:31

Great. Thank you all for taking the time.

Lisa 00:51:34

Thank you.

Rai 00:51:36

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