Ralph Stefan Weir joins me to discuss his book, The Mind-Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. We talk about the myth of the interaction problem, the connection between theism and the soul, the implausibility of property dualism, substance dualism in Eastern thought, the causal closure argument and energy conservation, a posteriori necessities, modal rationalism, panpsychism and idealism, personal identity, transhumanism, mind-uploading, split brain cases, whether souls are eternal, and much else. 

Dustin Crummett's interview with Dr. Weir

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For reference, here are the two arguments from the book we spent the most time on:

DISEMBODIMENT ARGUMENT

(i) The phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical.

(ii) If the phenomenal facts do not a priori entail the existence of anything physical, then they do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.

(iii) Therefore, the phenomenal facts do not necessitate the existence of anything physical.


PARITY ARGUMENT

(i) If you accept the conceivability argument, you must accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument.

(ii) If you accept the phenomenal disembodiment argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.

(iii) Therefore, if you accept the conceivability argument, then you must accept the existence of nonphysical substances.

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