Yeah, and it's worth saying that this wasn't always a partisan issue. I mean, the greatest number of antitrust cases seems to have been run under President Eisenhower, not under the, not under a Democratic president. So not always as partisan as it is today, but then what isn't partisan today. So that's just the way the word has, has gone. So maybe, maybe

we will say that there's been significant bipartisan support in the US for specific cases as well. A number of state attorneys general across, you know, both Republican and Democrat have teamed up to bring cases against Google or Facebook. And you know, although there might be slightly different motivations for why they want to use antitrust as a tool and a tactic, there, you do see this being one area where there is, you know, there is a willingness to work together.

That is very encouraging. No, we know what we see from the side of the Atlantic. Maybe we need better coverage of the United States. So we may not get a musical on Jefferson, but we might get one on Brando's. Right. Absolutely. I like that idea. That would be great. So we obviously get the thing on pricing, they're band together and pricing. There are many other consequences from this. We've dealt with the political one. But another one you say is that it leads to lower investment. I think most people looking at the economy see that low investment is probably one of our problems. If you explain how the greater concentration of par amongst corporations may be leading to lower investment.

Yeah, I think you can see this in a number of ways. And again, there isn't, you know, I'm not into sort of monocosle explanations for things because the world is a complex adaptive system as, you know, the economy is. And so there are many factors that play into this, but you can, you know, you can see it, you can intuit that if there are only a few companies at the top of each industry, they don't have a lot of motivation to continue to innovate, continue to spend on R&D or CapEx improvements on their business. And I think, you know, this also coincides with the kind of financialization of the firm where, you know, we saw in 2021 Tesla made more money selling carbon market credits, regulatory credits and Bitcoin than it ever has selling cars. And most firms are now investment firms, right? Most companies are investment companies in some shape or form. And you've seen a huge rise in stock buybacks. And you've seen ways of using financial engineering effectively to, to pad, you know, profit margins to boost stock price. And, and these are not long term investments in innovation that will put firms in good stead, you know, over the course of, do you link, do you link the financial engineering to the issue of all of our career? I think that there is, I do think that there's a link where there has been some academic research to show that in more highly concentrated industries, there's a higher propensity for stock buybacks. And you know, and I think there's, there's also some literature on what's called horizontal shareholding, which is because you can't think of companies in isolation, you know, they, they're owned by investors, they're owned by the capital markets. And if, you know, if you think about Warren Buffett, he used the strategy a lot where for many years he refused to touch airlines. But as soon as they had gotten to the point where they were highly concentrated into four in the US, he actually bought into each one. And he was the primary or secondary shareholder in each of the four major US airlines. And so if you're Warren Buffett, do you want the airlines to compete against each other for market share constantly and be squabbling over, you know, who gets to do what route? Or do you want them to effectively tacitly collude to, you know, raise prices on consumers, maybe pull back on some of the, they call it capacity discipline where they, they reduce the amount of flights that they will take from specific location. So it's, you know, it's a way of restricting output. And you know, if you're Warren Buffett, that's what you want, right? You want the industry as it's, as a whole to do well, you don't want the companies within the industry to compete. And so there, there's been some evidence, some academic papers that have written about this concept of horizontal shareholding, which by the way is illegal under the Clayton Act. It's just, you know, it really hasn't, hasn't ever been brought in a case. But interestingly, this is kind of coming back now because recently there's been a lot of discussion with institutional owners, you know, who see themselves as universal owners of the entire market who say, well, I can't diversify away my climate risk, risk as an example. And, and so they've been getting together in these investor coalitions, one of which is called G-fans, the Glasgow Financial Lines for Net Zero that was started by Mark Carney. And they were saying things like, okay, well, we're, we're going to jointly commit as, you know, the 500 biggest banks and asset managers around the world to start divesting from coal. Well, then the Republican, Republicans got wind of this and they said, actually, you can't do that. That's an antitrust violation because you're boycotting an industry. You're collectively doing these agreements to risk, you know, to restrict capital to the industry, which is going to raise prices on consumers. And there is a, there's a kernel of truth to that argument that it is legitimate that that traditionally would be seen as an antitrust violation. But again, it's interesting because it gets into these questions of, you know, where, what are the, what are the boundaries of competition and collaboration in markets? And you can't just look at the firm level increasingly, you have to think about, you know, the multi-level capital market stack of who's collaborating at what levels and for what interests and what purposes.