Speaker 2
me give you a non-science fiction example. And also, I have a million, I have a whole petting zoo of pet peeves. But yes, we call it the Laplacian demon, but it was actually Bosch Gewich, almost as much earlier. I mean, I did not. I did not. Almost almost almost cribbed. I mean, if you read it, he was plagiarizing
Speaker 1
from Bosch. The plagiarist? Yeah,
Speaker 2
he was. I mean, it's very interesting. Anyway, look, let me give you a non-science fiction example. Suppose you're at a restaurant and you're going to be given a choice of desserts. One is a creme brulee
Speaker 1
and the other is a bowl of broken glass. I hereby predict with real certainty which one you're going to choose.
Speaker 2
I can predict that not because you're not free, but because you are free. Quite honestly, if you decided to eat the broken glass, I would assume somebody was holding a gun to your head and you were
Speaker 1
not making a free, you know, you were making, certainly being coerced. Why? Because that's the preference you have. That's the preference anybody would have. The fact
Speaker 2
that I can predict you're going to do it. Of course, I can predict you're going to do it because those are your preferences and you're going to act in a way that will maximize your preferences. Why should my ability to predict that make you any less free? Well, because I think that sort of aligns the force of
Speaker 1
complete prediction here. When we're confronted with a system whose behavior we can fully predict, that is tantamount to saying that there is no freedom in the system. It's completely rigid. However complicated it might be, if we know everything it's going to do in advance, it would be delusional of that system for it to think at any point along the way that it could have done otherwise because we
Speaker 2
know it can't do otherwise.
