So let's now think about that. Have this divide between this explicit, that judging the component parts before you get to the intuitive decision making, we could use an old term from psychology and say before you get to the Gestalt, that you have to break it down into its building blocks. So as we think about where this ends up going in terms of your work and cognitive bias, obviously this worked really well in the Israeli army. But as you now get a PhD in psychology and start embarking on research, from today's world, we look and we say, well, everybody knows that there's cognitive bias. Right. I mean, I think that people sort of, you know, people are pretty familiar with the idea that we aren't perfectly rational actors and

well, you know, if you go back, and now you're asking about a period in my life that was about almost 20 years later. So in 1969, I started working with Amr Thuspe and when we started working on judgment. And actually, our first question was about professional psychologists and how they make decisions about what size was sampled and they want to run. So that sounds very modern, but that's exactly how we began. And we found systematic mistakes, just a large systematic mistake. Both of us had taught statistics. When you teach to this thing, there are concepts that are just very difficult. The concept of regression to the mean is very unfamiliar. It's very difficult to think standard errors are really not an easy concept to convey. So there are concepts that you know people don't have, the people don't have the law of law of number, you know, they just don't have it built in to their repertoire of intuition. So we started thinking of errors which are systematic and are cognitive and corrugated. When we started that work, there was a theory of error and it was completely different. The theory of error, the dominant theory error was motivational. It was motivated belief and psychoanalysis was in the background and psychoanalysis explained a lot of errors by unconscious motives and so on. That was in the background. So on that background, what we changed was really we said cognition is very much like perception. And in perception, there are illusions, but we know that basically perception works well. The illusions are a side effect of the way the mind works in order to achieve the marvelous accuracy that it usually achieves. This is the way of thinking that we were going to apply to cognition. So the biases are equivalent to illusions and then they are side effects of what the mind does in order to reach conclusions that in general, quite often, are quite reasonable. But here we were misunderstood in a very big way. People thought that we were saying that everybody's completely irrational all the time and we really didn't think so. We really were taking very seriously the idea that cognition is like perception and nobody said that perception is no

good.