The Problem of Concept Formation, Generalization, Scientific Induction, and Philosophical Induction

This is in response to a paper by Objectivist scholar Thomas Miovas Jr who operates a website about Objectivism here: https://www.appliedphilosophyonline.com. The relevant paper can be found here:

https://www.appliedphilosophyonline.com/induction-in-philosophy-and-the-special-sciences.html?fbclid=IwAR2cNLVGxyguM5R2TXaYe3OVclhw34lAdIKN0Mp13zTLK-J8dPMmnfNVlOs

In this episode I discuss induction broadly speaking, the objectivist usage of the term and Thomas Miovas attempts to salvage the word despite noticing issues with it as it is typically formulated. This leads to a comparison between Rand's style of philosophy - especially epistemology and it's tendency towards abstractions and Karl Popper's far more practical and concrete problem centred approach. Herein I look at how theory-laden any observation is - like simply observing how the sky can be blue. What does "The sky is blue" mean? Is there a sky? Is the air blue? What is scattering? Popper's vision of how knowledge is constructed accounts for this complex notion of our minds coming to solve such problems: Rand's on the other hand is left grappling with why we do not "observe the facts of reality" as she, and other objectivists such as Thomas Miovas, claim we can.