Morgan Stanley Research analysts Michelle Weaver, Chris Snyder and Nik Lippmann discuss U.S.-Mexico trade and the future of reshoring and near-shoring under the Trump administration.

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Michelle Weaver: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Michelle Weaver, U.S. Thematic and Equity Strategist at Morgan Stanley.

Christopher Snyder: I’m Chris Snyder, US Multi-Industry Analyst.

Nikolaj Lippmann: And I'm Nik Lippmann, Chief Latin America Equity Strategist.

Michelle Weaver: On this episode of our special mini-series covering Big Debates, we'll talk about the U.S.-Mexico trade relationship and the key issues around reshoring and nearshoring.

It's Friday, January 31st at 10am in New York.

The imposition of tariffs back in 2018 under the first Trump administration and the COVID pandemic put a severe strain on global supply chains and catalyzed reshoring and nearshoring in North America. But with inflation and supply chain concerns no longer front and center, investors are questioning whether the U.S. reshoring momentum can continue.

Chris, what's your view here?

Christopher Snyder: I think it's in the very early innings. You know, if you look at the history of U.S. manufacturing, the country really started ceding share in about 2000 when China joined the World Trade Organization. So, it's been going on for 25 years; we've been giving share back to the world. I think the process of taking share back is probably slower and ultimately is a multi-decade opportunity.

But you're absolutely right. The supply chain concerns are no longer like they were three to four years ago. But what I think has persevered since the pandemic is this heightened focus on operational durability and resiliency; and really shortening supply chains and getting closer to the end user, which I'm sure we'll hear more from Nick about, on the Mexico side.

But, you know, if you kind of look back at global supply chains and manufacturing, it's really been a chase to find low-cost labor for the last 45 years. And while that's always important, we think going forward, capital and proximity to end users will increasingly dictate that regional allocation of CapEx. I mean, those parameters are very supportive for the U. S.

You know, one thing I would like to kind of, you know, make sure is known on our U.S. reshoring view is that, you know, oftentimes it's thought of that we're shutting down a factory in China and reopening the same factory in the United States, and that's really a very rare example.

Our view is that the world, and very specific industries need to add capacity. And we just simply think that the U.S. is better positioned to get that incremental factory relative to any point in the last 45 years, due to the combination of structural tech diffusion, but also this focus on resiliency. And one thing that I really do think is underappreciated is that global manufacturing grows 4 to 5 per cent a year. In the U.S. it's been more in the 1 to 2 percent range because we're constantly ceding share. But even if the U.S. just stops giving back share, you could see the growth profile of U.S. industrials double.

Michelle Weaver: How would you size the reshoring opportunity? Do you have a dollar amount on what that could be worth?

Christopher Snyder: Yeah, we’ve sized it at $10 trillion. You know, and it's been a combination of the CapEx, the fixed asset investment that's needed to build these factories, then ultimately the production, you know, opportunity that will come to those factories thereafter.

Michelle Weaver: And you've argued that the U.S. reshoring flame was really lit in 2018 with the first wave of the Trump tariffs. It seems clear that trade policies by the new administration will continue to support reshoring. What's your outlook there?

Christopher Snyder: Yeah, you're absolutely right. Prior to 2018, there wasn't really a thought process. If you need an incremental factory, you most likely just put it in China. And I think the tariffs, back in 2018 or [20]19 really started, or kickstarted boardroom conversations around global supply chains. So, I think a Trump presidency absolutely adds duration to this theme via protectionism or tariffs that the administration will implement.

If you go back to the Trump 1.0 tariffs, supply chains reacted to the change in cost structures very quickly. We didn't see a huge wave of investment back into the United States. We just saw production exit China and move to broader Asia, because the focus was tariff avoidance.

Now, we think the focus is around building operational, resiliency and durability which better positions the U.S. to get that incremental factory. And one thing that I think is underappreciated here is just how much leverage U.S. politicians have. The U.S. is the best demand region in the world. The U.S. accounts for about 30 per cent of global goods consumption. That's equal to the E.U. and China combined. It's also the best margin region in the world, not only for U.S. companies; but most international companies do their best margins in the United States. So, you can raise the cost to serve the U.S. market, and no one is turning away from the region that has the best demand and the best margins.

Michelle Weaver: So, of course, tariffs in the pandemic have been major catalysts for U.S. reshoring. Have there been any other drivers like tech diffusion?

Christopher Snyder: Yeah. I view the pandemic as the catalyst, and I view tech diffusion as the structural tailwind for U.S. manufacturing. Over time, we will continue to figure out ways to squeeze labor out of the manufacturing cost profile. It's hard to kind of pinpoint it, but I think if we look out over any 5- or 10-year window, we will see that. That's a structural talent for the United States, given the high labor costs. And really what it will help do is just narrow the cost delta, between low cost producing regions. I also think as we kind of extend this tech diffusion into GenAI; I also think what's going on is, will fuel another round of protectionism. So, you know, kind of further keeping that cycle going.

Michelle Weaver: Nick, of course the big question investors are asking is how will the Trump trade agenda impact Mexico? Contrary to the prevailing market view, you've argued that Mexico can actually win big with Trump. How's this possible?

Nikolaj Lippmann: That's right, Michelle. Look, we recently upgraded Mexico to equal weight, from underweight. And while some of the news we see around the administration seems a bit like a sequel, there are other things that are just very different.

We're not talking about ripping apart the USMCA but actually bringing forward renegotiations from [20]26 to [20]25. It's a much more constructive message. It's a very young deal, and yet I think the world we live in today is quite different from the world of 2018. When we look at what are some of the things where Mexico could actually end up winning big, we look at the regionalism that appears to be a number one agenda.

We look at the – how difficult it would be for the United States to de-risk from China. And from Mexico simultaneously. And also, fundamentally at that integration across the border, the industrial integration. It's clear that there's a need for calibration. There's a need for calibration in terms of a lot of the trade policy. There's been talks about maybe a customs union and I think that's far out in the future. But there's a need to try to figure out how to calibrate trade. And also, you know, there are things that Mexican policy makers can do to deal with the non-trade related issues, such as immigration or the cartels. And I think frankly, it's in Mexico's interest to deal with some of these issues.

Michelle Weaver: Where are we in the whole Mexico as a China bridge versus China buffer debate?

Nikolaj Lippmann: Right. That's another good question, Michelle. And one thing that we've been writing a lot about. The key difference from where we were, in Trump 1.0 and now is just how different the relationship with China really is. And I think one area where we've been scratching our head a little bit with regards to the – how Mexican policymakers have reacted after signing the USMCA deal is really just around that. That relationship with China. Well, I think that might have – they might have misread or underestimated just how much times have changed.

We've seen a big increase in import from China. There have been very specific manufacturing ecosystems. And we've also seen increased investments by China and Mexico. Now, this has caused Mexico's trade deficit with China to go up a lot – almost double. And we've also seen an increase in the trade deficit between Mexico and the United States, in Mexico's favor.

Now, that could imply that it's all the China bridge, I think that's far from the truth. But, you know, Mexico is probably two-third or a little more above. It's really that integration that I think policy makers in Mexico need to understand. And then you need to manage that these emerging elements of being a bridge. This is not in Mexico's interest; it's not in the U.S. interest to simply just be a bridge.

We have done a lot of surveys with corporates around the world; and the way the European, and American companies in particular view Mexico is completely different from the way Asian and in particular Chinese companies view Mexico. The Chinese companies view Mexico much more as a place of assembly – whereas Americans think of Mexico as an integrated part of the manufacturing value chain.

Michelle Weaver: Finally, how will the Mexico nearshoring theme develop from here?

Nikolaj Lippmann: This is a great debate, I think. And one that's going to be – I think we're going to be writing a lot with Chris about, and with you guys around, about. Also, with the U.S. policy team. We laid out in 2022 this hypothesis that onshoring, nearshoring was about to happen. In terms of Mexico, it would imply $150 billion over five years. And very importantly, it was going to be – it could happen so fast because it was brownfield.

It was more to the same. Where you already had manufacturing ecosystems, you could add to that. We saw very little evidence that you could do greenfield. But now that the world has evolved, we're looking at some of these greenfield manufacturing ecosystems that are really not present in North America, not in the United States, not in Canada, not in Mexico, such as EV batteries or IT hardware, some of the things that are starting to emerge around the big chip investments.

And we're wondering what are going to be the policy objectives pertaining to these very specific manufacturing ecosystems that in many cases are quite important for national security. If that is to happen, I think it's going to happen slower, much like what Chris laid out, but it's going to be much more impactful. So, I'm sure we're going to be working closely on these debates.

Michelle Weaver: Nick, Chris, thank you for taking the time to talk. And to our listeners, thanks for listening. If you enjoy Thoughts on the Market, please leave us a review wherever you listen to the show and share the podcast with a friend or colleague today.