Minds, Machines and Gödel
Book • 1961
In 'Minds, Machines and Gödel', J.R.
Lucas presents a philosophical argument against mechanism, the idea that human minds can be fully explained as machines.
He uses Gödel's incompleteness theorem to argue that no machine can be a complete model of the mind, as there will always be mathematical truths that a machine cannot prove but a human can see as true.
This work challenges the notion of strong artificial intelligence and has been influential in debates about the nature of mind and machine.
Lucas presents a philosophical argument against mechanism, the idea that human minds can be fully explained as machines.
He uses Gödel's incompleteness theorem to argue that no machine can be a complete model of the mind, as there will always be mathematical truths that a machine cannot prove but a human can see as true.
This work challenges the notion of strong artificial intelligence and has been influential in debates about the nature of mind and machine.
